SigmaHQ/rules/windows/builtin/win_net_ntlm_downgrade.yml
Maxime Thiebaut 73a6428345 Update the NTLM downgrade registry paths
Recent windows versions rely on the ["MSV1_0" authentication package](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthn/msv1-0-authentication-package). Production environment tests have shown that NTLM downgrade attacks can be performed as detected by this rule although some of the registry keys are located in an "Lsa" subkey ("MSV1_0"). This commit introduces additionnal wildcards to handle these cases to ensure the previous detection rules are still included.
2020-04-07 17:14:45 +02:00

42 lines
1.2 KiB
YAML

action: global
title: NetNTLM Downgrade Attack
id: d67572a0-e2ec-45d6-b8db-c100d14b8ef2
description: Detects post exploitation using NetNTLM downgrade attacks
references:
- https://www.optiv.com/blog/post-exploitation-using-netntlm-downgrade-attacks
author: Florian Roth
date: 2018/03/20
tags:
- attack.credential_access
- attack.t1212
detection:
condition: 1 of them
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: critical
---
logsource:
product: windows
service: sysmon
detection:
selection1:
EventID: 13
TargetObject:
- '*SYSTEM\\*ControlSet*\Control\Lsa\lmcompatibilitylevel'
- '*SYSTEM\\*ControlSet*\Control\Lsa*\NtlmMinClientSec'
- '*SYSTEM\\*ControlSet*\Control\Lsa*\RestrictSendingNTLMTraffic'
---
# Windows Security Eventlog: Process Creation with Full Command Line
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
definition: 'Requirements: Audit Policy : Object Access > Audit Registry (Success)'
detection:
selection2:
EventID: 4657
ObjectName: '\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\\*ControlSet*\Control\Lsa*'
ObjectValueName:
- 'LmCompatibilityLevel'
- 'NtlmMinClientSec'
- 'RestrictSendingNTLMTraffic'