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07e3cd2864
These dates were pulled out of the Git commit for the tag (with a Vim macro). I didn't go back before we started tagging releases with annotated tags since that would take some mailing list archaeology. Also there might be a couple instances where the tag came plus or minus a day or two from the announcement. Closes #9426
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=========================
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Salt 0.15.1 Release Notes
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=========================
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:release: 2013-05-08
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The 0.15.1 release has been posted, this release includes fixes to a number of
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bugs in 0.15.1 and a three security patches.
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Security Updates
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================
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A number of security issues have been resolved via the 0.15.1 release.
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Path Injection in Minion IDs
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----------------------------
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Salt masters did not properly validate the id of a connecting minion. This can
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lead to an attacker uploading files to the master in arbitrary locations.
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In particular this can be used to bypass the manual validation of new unknown
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minions. Exploiting this vulnerability does not require authentication.
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This issue affects all known versions of Salt.
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This issue was reported by Ronald Volgers.
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Patch
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~~~~~
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The issue is fixed in Salt 0.15.1. Updated packages are available in the usual
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locations.
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Specific commits:
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https://github.com/saltstack/salt/commit/5427b9438e452a5a8910d9128c6aafb45d8fd5d3
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https://github.com/saltstack/salt/commit/7560908ee62351769c3cd43b03d74c1ca772cc52
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https://github.com/saltstack/salt/commit/e200b8a7ff53780124e08d2bdefde7587e52bfca
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RSA Key Generation Fault
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------------------------
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RSA key generation was done incorrectly, leading to very insecure keys. It is
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recommended to regenerate all RSA keys.
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This issue can be used to impersonate Salt masters or minions, or decrypt any
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transferred data.
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This issue can only be exploited by attackers who are able to observe or modify
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traffic between Salt minions and the legitimate Salt master.
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A tool was included in 0.15.1 to assist in mass key regeneration, the
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manage.regen_keys runner.
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This issue affects all known versions of Salt.
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This issue was reported by Ronald Volgers.
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Patch
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~~~~~
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The issue is fixed in Salt 0.15.1. Updated packages are available in the usual
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locations.
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Specific commits:
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https://github.com/saltstack/salt/commit/5dd304276ba5745ec21fc1e6686a0b28da29e6fc
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Command Injection Via ext_pillar
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--------------------------------
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Arbitrary shell commands could be executed on the master by an authenticated
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minion through options passed when requesting a pillar.
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Ext pillar options have been restricted to only allow safe external pillars to
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be called when prompted by the minion.
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This issue affects Salt versions from 0.14.0 to 0.15.0.
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This issue was reported by Ronald Volgers.
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Patch
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~~~~~
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The issue is fixed in Salt 0.15.1. Updated packages are available in the usual locations.
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Specific commits:
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https://github.com/saltstack/salt/commit/43d8c16bd26159d827d1a945c83ac28159ec5865
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