SigmaHQ/rules/windows/process_access/sysmon_cred_dump_lsass_access.yml

58 lines
2.1 KiB
YAML
Executable File

title: Credentials Dumping Tools Accessing LSASS Memory
id: 32d0d3e2-e58d-4d41-926b-18b520b2b32d
status: experimental
description: Detects process access LSASS memory which is typical for credentials dumping tools
author: Florian Roth, Roberto Rodriguez, Dimitrios Slamaris, Mark Russinovich, Thomas Patzke, Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Sherif Eldeeb, James Dickenson, Aleksey Potapov,
oscd.community (update)
date: 2017/02/16
modified: 2020/08/24
references:
- https://onedrive.live.com/view.aspx?resid=D026B4699190F1E6!2843&ithint=file%2cpptx&app=PowerPoint&authkey=!AMvCRTKB_V1J5ow
- https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for_22.html
- https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment
- http://security-research.dyndns.org/pub/slides/FIRST2017/FIRST-2017_Tom-Ueltschi_Sysmon_FINAL_notes.pdf
tags:
- attack.credential_access
- attack.t1003.001
- attack.t1003 # an old one
- attack.s0002
- car.2019-04-004
logsource:
category: process_access
product: windows
detection:
selection:
TargetImage|endswith: '\lsass.exe'
GrantedAccess|contains:
- '0x40'
- '0x1000'
- '0x1400'
- '0x100000'
- '0x1410' # car.2019-04-004
- '0x1010' # car.2019-04-004
- '0x1438' # car.2019-04-004
- '0x143a' # car.2019-04-004
- '0x1418' # car.2019-04-004
- '0x1f0fff'
- '0x1f1fff'
- '0x1f2fff'
- '0x1f3fff'
filter:
ProcessName|endswith: # easy to bypass. need to implement supportive rule to detect bypass attempts
- '\wmiprvse.exe'
- '\taskmgr.exe'
- '\procexp64.exe'
- '\procexp.exe'
- '\lsm.exe'
- '\csrss.exe'
- '\wininit.exe'
- '\vmtoolsd.exe'
condition: selection and not filter
fields:
- ComputerName
- User
- SourceImage
falsepositives:
- Legitimate software accessing LSASS process for legitimate reason; update the whitelist with it
level: high