SigmaHQ/rules/windows/builtin/win_susp_mshta_execution.yml

37 lines
1.3 KiB
YAML

title: MSHTA Suspicious Execution 01
id: cc7abbd0-762b-41e3-8a26-57ad50d2eea3
status: experimental
description: Detection for mshta.exe suspicious execution patterns sometimes involving file polyglotism
date: 2019/02/22
modified: 2020/08/23
author: Diego Perez (@darkquassar), Markus Neis, Swisscom (Improve Rule)
references:
- http://blog.sevagas.com/?Hacking-around-HTA-files
- https://0x00sec.org/t/clientside-exploitation-in-2018-how-pentesting-has-changed/7356
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/standard/data/xml/xslt-stylesheet-scripting-using-msxsl-script
- https://medium.com/tsscyber/pentesting-and-hta-bypassing-powershell-constrained-language-mode-53a42856c997
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1140
- attack.t1218.005
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
falsepositives:
- False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment
level: high
detection:
selection1:
Image: '*\mshta.exe'
CommandLine:
- '*vbscript*'
- '*.jpg*'
- '*.png*'
- '*.lnk*'
# - '*.chm*' # could be prone to false positives
- '*.xls*'
- '*.doc*'
- '*.zip*'
condition:
selection1