SigmaHQ/rules/windows/image_load/sysmon_in_memory_powershell.yml
2020-10-18 01:16:11 +03:00

44 lines
1.7 KiB
YAML
Executable File

title: In-memory PowerShell
id: 092bc4b9-3d1d-43b4-a6b4-8c8acd83522f
status: experimental
description: Detects loading of essential DLL used by PowerShell, but not by the process powershell.exe. Detects meterpreter's "load powershell" extension.
author: Tom Kern, oscd.community, Natalia Shornikova
date: 2019/11/14
modified: 2020/10/12
references:
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=2921
- https://github.com/p3nt4/PowerShdll
tags:
- attack.t1086 # an old one
- attack.t1059.001
- attack.execution
logsource:
category: image_load
product: windows
detection:
selection:
ImageLoaded|endswith:
- '\System.Management.Automation.Dll'
- '\System.Management.Automation.ni.Dll'
filter:
Image|endswith:
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\powershell_ise.exe'
- '\WINDOWS\System32\sdiagnhost.exe'
- '\mscorsvw.exe' # c:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\mscorsw.exe for instance
- '\WINDOWS\System32\RemoteFXvGPUDisablement.exe' # on win10
- '\sqlps.exe'
- '\wsmprovhost.exe'
- '\winrshost.exe'
- '\syncappvpublishingserver.exe'
- '\runscripthelper.exe'
- '\ServerManager.exe'
# User: 'NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM' # if set, matches all powershell processes not launched by SYSTEM
condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- Used by some .NET binaries, minimal on user workstation.
level: high
enrichment:
- EN_0001_cache_sysmon_event_id_1_info # http://bit.ly/314zc6x
- EN_0003_enrich_other_sysmon_events_with_event_id_1_data # http://bit.ly/2ojW7fw