SigmaHQ/rules/windows/builtin/win_susp_psexec.yml
2019-11-12 23:12:27 +01:00

31 lines
1.0 KiB
YAML

title: Suspicious PsExec execution
id: c462f537-a1e3-41a6-b5fc-b2c2cef9bf82
description: detects execution of psexec or paexec with renamed service name, this rule helps to filter out the noise if psexec is used for legit purposes or if attacker
uses a different psexec client other than sysinternal one
author: Samir Bousseaden
references:
- https://blog.menasec.net/2019/02/threat-hunting-3-detecting-psexec.html
tags:
- attack.lateral_movement
- attack.t1077
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
description: 'The advanced audit policy setting "Object Access > Audit Detailed File Share" must be configured for Success/Failure'
detection:
selection1:
EventID: 5145
ShareName: \\*\IPC$
RelativeTargetName:
- '*-stdin'
- '*-stdout'
- '*-stderr'
selection2:
EventID: 5145
ShareName: \\*\IPC$
RelativeTargetName: 'PSEXESVC*'
condition: selection1 and not selection2
falsepositives:
- nothing observed so far
level: high