SigmaHQ/rules/windows/sysmon/sysmon_registry_persistence_search_order.yml

30 lines
1.2 KiB
YAML

title: Windows Registry Persistence COM Search Order Hijacking
id: a0ff33d8-79e4-4cef-b4f3-9dc4133ccd12
status: experimental
description: Detects potential COM object hijacking leveraging the COM Search Order
references:
- https://www.cyberbit.com/blog/endpoint-security/com-hijacking-windows-overlooked-security-vulnerability/
author: Maxime Thiebaut (@0xThiebaut)
date: 2020/04/14
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1038
logsource:
product: windows
service: sysmon
detection:
selection: # Detect new COM servers in the user hive
EventID: 13
TargetObject: 'HKU\\*_Classes\CLSID\\*\InProcServer32\(Default)'
filter:
Details: # Exclude privileged directories and observed FPs
- '%%systemroot%%\system32\\*'
- '%%systemroot%%\SysWow64\\*'
- '*\AppData\Local\Microsoft\OneDrive\\*\FileCoAuthLib64.dll'
- '*\AppData\Local\Microsoft\OneDrive\\*\FileSyncShell64.dll'
- '*\AppData\Local\Microsoft\TeamsMeetingAddin\\*\Microsoft.Teams.AddinLoader.dll'
condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- Some installed utilities (i.e. OneDrive) may serve new COM objects at user-level
level: medium