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# This workflows will upload a Python Package using Twine when a release is created
# For more information see: https://help.github.com/en/actions/language-and-framework-guides/using-python-with-github-actions#publishing-to-package-registries
name: Upload Sigmatools Package to PyPI
on:
release:
types: [created]
jobs:
deploy:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v2
- name: Set up Python
uses: actions/setup-python@v1
with:
python-version: '3.x'
- name: Install dependencies
run: |
python -m pip install --upgrade pip
pip install setuptools wheel twine
- name: Build and publish
env:
TWINE_USERNAME: ${{ secrets.PYPI_USERNAME }}
TWINE_PASSWORD: ${{ secrets.PYPI_PASSWORD }}
run: |
make upload

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# This workflow will install Python dependencies, run tests and lint with a single version of Python
# For more information see: https://help.github.com/actions/language-and-framework-guides/using-python-with-github-actions
name: Sigma Tools and Rule Tests
on:
push:
branches:
- "*"
pull_request:
branches: [ master ]
jobs:
test-sigma:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v2
- name: Set up Python 3.8
uses: actions/setup-python@v1
with:
python-version: 3.8
- name: Install dependencies
run: |
python -m pip install --upgrade pip
pip install -r tools/requirements.txt -r tools/requirements-devel.txt
wget -qO - https://artifacts.elastic.co/GPG-KEY-elasticsearch | sudo apt-key add -
sudo apt install -y apt-transport-https
echo "deb https://artifacts.elastic.co/packages/7.x/apt stable main" | sudo tee -a /etc/apt/sources.list.d/elastic.list
sudo apt update
sudo apt install -y elasticsearch
sudo systemctl start elasticsearch
- name: Test Sigma Tools and Rules
run: |
make test
- name: Test Generated Elasticsearch Query Strings
run: |
make test-backend-es-qs
- name: Test SQL(ite) Backend
run: |
make test-backend-sql

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.gitignore vendored
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@ -94,3 +94,7 @@ settings.json
# VisualStudio
.vs/
.vscode/launch.json
# sigma2attack
heatmap.json

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@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
language: python
dist: xenial
python:
# - 3.5 # Deactivated because Travis CI tests failed randomly (Travis's problem)
- 3.6
- 3.7
sudo: true
services:
- elasticsearch
cache: pip
before_install:
- curl -O https://artifacts.elastic.co/downloads/elasticsearch/elasticsearch-6.2.4.deb && sudo dpkg -i --force-confnew elasticsearch-6.2.4.deb && sudo service elasticsearch restart
install:
- pip install -r tools/requirements-devel.txt
- pip install -r tests/requirements-test.txt
script:
- make test
- make test-backend-es-qs
notifications:
email:
recipients:
- venom14@gmail.com
- thomas@patzke.org
on_success: change
on_failure: always

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@ -6,18 +6,69 @@ The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.0.0/),
and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html)
from version 0.14.0.
## Unreleased
## 0.17.0 - 2020-06-12
### Added
* LOGIQ Backend (logiq)
* CarbonBlack backend (carbonblack) and field mappings
* Elasticsearch detection rule backend (es-rule)
* ee-outliers backend
* CrowdStrike backend (crowdstrike)
* Humio backend (humio)
* Aggregations in SQL backend
* SQLite backend (sqlite)
* AWS Cloudtrail ECS mappings
* Overrides
* Zeek configurations for various backends
* Case-insensitive matching for Elasticsearch
* ECS proxy mappings
* RuleName field mapping for Winlogbeat
* sigma2attack tool
### Changed
* Improved usage of keyword fields for Elasticsearch-based backends
* Splunk XML backend rule titles from sigma rule instead of file name
* Moved backend option list to --help-backend
* Microsoft Defender ATP schema improvements
### Fixed
* Splunx XML rule name is now set to rule title
* Backend list deduplicated
* Wrong escaping of wildcard at end of value when startswith modifier is used.
* Direct execution of tools on Windows systems by addition of script entry points
## 0.16.0 - 2020-02-25
### Added
* Proxy field names to ECS mapping (ecs-proxy) configuration
* False positives metadata to LimaCharlie backend
* Additional aggregation capabilitied for es-dsl backend.
* Azure log analytics rule backend (ala-rule)
* SQL backend
* Splunk Zeek sourcetype mapping config
* sigma2attack script
* Carbon Black backend and configuration
* ArcSight ESM backend
* Elasticsearch detection rule backend
### Changed
* Kibana object id is now Sigma rule id if available. Else
the old naming scheme is used.
* sigma2misp: replacement of deprecated method usage.
* Various configuration updates
* Extended ArcSight mapping
### Fixed
* Fixed aggregation queries for Elastalert backend
* Fixed aggregation queries for es-dsl backend
* Backend and configuration lists are sorted.
* Escaping in ala backend
## 0.15.0 - 2019-12-06
@ -66,7 +117,7 @@ from version 0.14.0.
### Added
* Index mappings for Sumologic
* Malicious cmdlets in wdatp
* Malicious cmdlets in mdatp
* QRadar support for keyword searches
* QRadar mapping improvements
* QRadar field selection
@ -122,4 +173,4 @@ from version 0.14.0.
* Conditions in es-dsl backend
* Sumologic handling of null values
* Ignore timeframe detection keyword in all/any of conditions
* Ignore timeframe detection keyword in all/any of conditions

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@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
# Detection Rule License (DRL) 1.0
Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of this rule set and associated documentation files (the "Rules"), to deal in the Rules without restriction, including without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Rules, and to permit persons to whom the Rules are furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
If you share the Rules (including in modified form), you must retain the following if it is supplied within the Rules:
1. identification of the authors(s) ("author" field) of the Rule and any others designated to receive attribution, in any reasonable manner requested by the Rule author (including by pseudonym if designated).
2. a URI or hyperlink to the Rule set or explicit Rule to the extent reasonably practicable
3. indicate the Rules are licensed under this Detection Rule License, and include the text of, or the URI or hyperlink to, this Detection Rule License to the extent reasonably practicable
THE RULES ARE PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE RULES OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE RULES.

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@ -1,674 +0,0 @@
GNU GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE
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174
Makefile
View File

@ -1,103 +1,125 @@
.PHONY: test test-rules test-sigmac test-sigma2attack
TMPOUT = $(shell tempfile||mktemp)
COVSCOPE = tools/sigma/*.py,tools/sigma/backends/*.py,tools/sigmac,tools/merge_sigma,tools/sigma2attack
export COVERAGE = coverage
test: clearcov test-rules test-sigmac test-merge test-sigma2attack build finish
clearcov:
rm -f .coverage
finish:
coverage report --fail-under=90
$(COVERAGE) report --fail-under=90
rm -f $(TMPOUT)
test-rules:
yamllint rules
tests/test_rules.py
tools/sigma-uuid -Ver rules/
tools/sigma_uuid -Ver rules/
test-sigmac:
coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac
coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -h
coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -l
! coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvd -t es-qs rules/ > /dev/null
! coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t es-qs rules/ > /dev/null
coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t es-qs --shoot-yourself-in-the-foot rules/ > /dev/null
coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t es-qs -c winlogbeat tests/test-modifiers.yml > /dev/null
coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -O rulecomment -rvdI -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml -t es-qs rules/ > /dev/null
coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t kibana -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml rules/ > /dev/null
coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t graylog rules/ > /dev/null
coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t xpack-watcher -O email,index,webhook -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml rules/ > /dev/null
coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t elastalert -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml -O alert_methods=http_post,email -O emails=test@test.invalid -O http_post_url=http://test.invalid rules/ > /dev/null
coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t elastalert-dsl -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml -O alert_methods=http_post,email -O emails=test@test.invalid -O http_post_url=http://test.invalid rules/ > /dev/null
! coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t splunk rules/ > /dev/null
coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t splunk -c tools/config/splunk-windows-index.yml rules/ > /dev/null
coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t splunkxml -c tools/config/splunk-windows.yml rules/ > /dev/null
coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t logpoint -c tools/config/logpoint-windows.yml rules/ > /dev/null
coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t wdatp rules/ > /dev/null
coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t ala rules/ > /dev/null
coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t ala-rule rules/ > /dev/null
coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t ala --backend-config tests/backend_config.yml rules/windows/process_creation/ > /dev/null
coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t es-dsl -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml rules/ > /dev/null
coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t powershell -c tools/config/powershell.yml -Ocsv rules/ > /dev/null
coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t arcsight -c tools/config/arcsight.yml rules/ > /dev/null
coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t qradar -c tools/config/qradar.yml rules/ > /dev/null
coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t limacharlie -c tools/config/limacharlie.yml rules/ > /dev/null
coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t qualys -c tools/config/qualys.yml rules/ > /dev/null
coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t netwitness -c tools/config/netwitness.yml rules/ > /dev/null
coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t sumologic -O rulecomment -c tools/config/sumologic.yml rules/ > /dev/null
coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t sql -O rulecomment -c sysmon rules/ > /dev/null
coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t splunk -c tools/config/splunk-windows-index.yml -f 'level>=high,level<=critical,status=stable,logsource=windows,tag=attack.execution' rules/ > /dev/null
! coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t splunk -c tools/config/splunk-windows-index.yml -f 'level>=high,level<=critical,status=xstable,logsource=windows' rules/ > /dev/null
! coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t splunk -c tools/config/splunk-windows-index.yml -f 'level>=high,level<=xcritical,status=stable,logsource=windows' rules/ > /dev/null
coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t splunk -c tools/config/splunk-windows-index.yml -f 'level=critical' rules/ > /dev/null
! coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t splunk -c tools/config/splunk-windows-index.yml -f 'level=xcritical' rules/ > /dev/null
! coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t splunk -c tools/config/splunk-windows-index.yml -f 'foo=bar' rules/ > /dev/null
coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -c tools/config/logstash-windows.yml -t es-qs rules/ > /dev/null
coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -c ecs-proxy -t es-qs rules/proxy > /dev/null
coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -c sysmon -c logstash-windows -t es-qs rules/ > /dev/null
! coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -c sysmon -c logstash-windows -t splunk rules/ > /dev/null
! coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -c tools/config/logstash-windows.yml -c tools/config/generic/sysmon.yml -t es-qs rules/ > /dev/null
coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -c tools/config/logstash-linux.yml -t es-qs rules/ > /dev/null
coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -c tools/config/logstash-windows.yml -t kibana rules/ > /dev/null
coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -c tools/config/logstash-windows.yml -Ooutput=curl -t kibana rules/ > /dev/null
coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -c tools/config/logstash-linux.yml -t kibana rules/ > /dev/null
coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -c tools/config/logstash-linux.yml -Ooutput=curl -t kibana rules/ > /dev/null
coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -c tools/config/logstash-windows.yml -t xpack-watcher rules/ > /dev/null
coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -c tools/config/logstash-linux.yml -t xpack-watcher rules/ > /dev/null
coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -c tools/config/filebeat-defaultindex.yml -t xpack-watcher rules/ > /dev/null
coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -c tools/config/splunk-windows.yml -t splunk rules/ > /dev/null
coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -c tools/config/generic/sysmon.yml -c tools/config/splunk-windows.yml -t splunk rules/ > /dev/null
coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t grep rules/ > /dev/null
coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t fieldlist rules/ > /dev/null
coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t xpack-watcher -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml -O output=plain -O es=es -O foobar rules/windows/builtin/win_susp_failed_logons_single_source.yml > /dev/null
coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t kibana -c tests/config-multiple_mapping.yml -c tests/config-multiple_mapping-2.yml tests/mapping-conditional-multi.yml > /dev/null
coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t xpack-watcher -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml -O output=json -O es=es -O foobar rules/windows/builtin/win_susp_failed_logons_single_source.yml > /dev/null
coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t es-qs -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml -o $(TMPOUT) - < tests/collection_repeat.yml > /dev/null
! coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t xpack-watcher -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml -O output=foobar -O es=es -O foobar rules/windows/builtin/win_susp_failed_logons_single_source.yml > /dev/null
! coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t es-qs -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml tests/not_existing.yml > /dev/null
! coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t es-qs -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml tests/invalid_yaml.yml > /dev/null
! coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t es-qs -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml tests/invalid_sigma-no_identifiers.yml > /dev/null
! coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t es-qs -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml tests/invalid_sigma-no_condition.yml > /dev/null
! coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t es-qs -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml tests/invalid_sigma-invalid_identifier_reference.yml > /dev/null
! coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t es-qs -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml tests/invalid_sigma-invalid_aggregation.yml > /dev/null
! coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t es-qs -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml tests/invalid_sigma-wrong_identifier_definition.yml > /dev/null
! coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t es-qs -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml rules/windows/builtin/win_susp_failed_logons_single_source.yml
! coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t es-qs -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml -o /not_possible rules/windows/sysmon/sysmon_mimikatz_detection_lsass.yml
! coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t es-qs -c not_existing rules/windows/sysmon/sysmon_mimikatz_detection_lsass.yml
! coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t es-qs -c tests/invalid_yaml.yml rules/windows/sysmon/sysmon_mimikatz_detection_lsass.yml
! coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t es-qs -c tests/invalid_config.yml rules/windows/sysmon/sysmon_mimikatz_detection_lsass.yml
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -h
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -l
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac --backend-help es-qs
! $(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvd -t es-qs rules/ > /dev/null
! $(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t es-qs rules/ > /dev/null
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t es-qs --shoot-yourself-in-the-foot rules/ > /dev/null
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t es-qs -c winlogbeat tests/test-modifiers.yml > /dev/null
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -O rulecomment -rvdI -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml -t es-qs rules/ > /dev/null
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t kibana -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml rules/ > /dev/null
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t graylog rules/ > /dev/null
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t xpack-watcher -O email,index,webhook -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml rules/ > /dev/null
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t elastalert -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml -O alert_methods=http_post,email -O emails=test@test.invalid -O http_post_url=http://test.invalid rules/ > /dev/null
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t elastalert-dsl -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml -O alert_methods=http_post,email -O emails=test@test.invalid -O http_post_url=http://test.invalid rules/ > /dev/null
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t ee-outliers -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml rules/ > /dev/null
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t es-qs -c sysmon -c winlogbeat -O case_insensitive_whitelist=* rules/windows/process_creation > /dev/null
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t es-qs -c tools/config/ecs-cloudtrail.yml rules/ > /dev/null
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t es-rule -c tools/config/ecs-cloudtrail.yml rules/ > /dev/null
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t kibana -c tools/config/ecs-cloudtrail.yml rules/ > /dev/null
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t xpack-watcher -c tools/config/ecs-cloudtrail.yml rules/ > /dev/null
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t elastalert -c tools/config/ecs-cloudtrail.yml rules/ > /dev/null
! $(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t splunk rules/ > /dev/null
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t splunk -c tools/config/splunk-windows-index.yml rules/ > /dev/null
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t splunkxml -c tools/config/splunk-windows.yml rules/ > /dev/null
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t logpoint -c tools/config/logpoint-windows.yml rules/ > /dev/null
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t mdatp rules/ > /dev/null
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t ala rules/ > /dev/null
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t ala-rule rules/ > /dev/null
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t ala --backend-config tests/backend_config.yml rules/windows/process_creation/ > /dev/null
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t es-dsl -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml rules/ > /dev/null
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t es-rule -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml rules/ > /dev/null
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t powershell -c tools/config/powershell.yml -Ocsv rules/ > /dev/null
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t arcsight -c tools/config/arcsight.yml rules/ > /dev/null
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t arcsight-esm -c tools/config/arcsight.yml rules/ > /dev/null
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t qradar -c tools/config/qradar.yml rules/ > /dev/null
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t stix -c tools/config/stix.yml -c tools/config/stix-qradar.yml -c tools/config/stix-windows.yml rules/ > /dev/null
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t limacharlie -c tools/config/limacharlie.yml rules/ > /dev/null
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t carbonblack -c tools/config/carbon-black.yml rules/ > /dev/null
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t qualys -c tools/config/qualys.yml rules/ > /dev/null
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t netwitness -c tools/config/netwitness.yml rules/ > /dev/null
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t sumologic -O rulecomment -c tools/config/sumologic.yml rules/ > /dev/null
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t humio -O rulecomment -c tools/config/humio.yml rules/ > /dev/null
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t crowdstrike -O rulecomment -c tools/config/crowdstrike.yml rules/ > /dev/null
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t sql -c sysmon rules/ > /dev/null
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t sqlite -c sysmon rules/ > /dev/null
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t csharp -c sysmon rules/ > /dev/null
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t logiq -c sysmon rules/ > /dev/null
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t splunk -c tools/config/splunk-windows-index.yml -f 'level>=high,level<=critical,status=stable,logsource=windows,tag=attack.execution' rules/ > /dev/null
! $(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t splunk -c tools/config/splunk-windows-index.yml -f 'level>=high,level<=critical,status=xstable,logsource=windows' rules/ > /dev/null
! $(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t splunk -c tools/config/splunk-windows-index.yml -f 'level>=high,level<=xcritical,status=stable,logsource=windows' rules/ > /dev/null
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t splunk -c tools/config/splunk-windows-index.yml -f 'level=critical' rules/ > /dev/null
! $(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t splunk -c tools/config/splunk-windows-index.yml -f 'level=xcritical' rules/ > /dev/null
! $(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t splunk -c tools/config/splunk-windows-index.yml -f 'foo=bar' rules/ > /dev/null
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -c tools/config/logstash-windows.yml -t es-qs rules/ > /dev/null
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -c ecs-proxy -t es-qs rules/proxy > /dev/null
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -c sysmon -c logstash-windows -t es-qs rules/ > /dev/null
! $(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -c sysmon -c logstash-windows -t splunk rules/ > /dev/null
! $(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -c tools/config/logstash-windows.yml -c tools/config/generic/sysmon.yml -t es-qs rules/ > /dev/null
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -c tools/config/logstash-linux.yml -t es-qs rules/ > /dev/null
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -c tools/config/logstash-windows.yml -t kibana rules/ > /dev/null
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -c tools/config/logstash-windows.yml -Ooutput=curl -t kibana rules/ > /dev/null
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -c tools/config/logstash-linux.yml -t kibana rules/ > /dev/null
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -c tools/config/logstash-linux.yml -Ooutput=curl -t kibana rules/ > /dev/null
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -c tools/config/logstash-windows.yml -t xpack-watcher rules/ > /dev/null
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -c tools/config/logstash-linux.yml -t xpack-watcher rules/ > /dev/null
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -c tools/config/filebeat-defaultindex.yml -t xpack-watcher rules/ > /dev/null
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -c tools/config/splunk-windows.yml -t splunk rules/ > /dev/null
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -c tools/config/generic/sysmon.yml -c tools/config/splunk-windows.yml -t splunk rules/ > /dev/null
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t grep rules/ > /dev/null
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t fieldlist rules/ > /dev/null
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t xpack-watcher -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml -O output=plain -O es=es -O foobar rules/windows/builtin/win_susp_failed_logons_single_source.yml > /dev/null
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t kibana -c tests/config-multiple_mapping.yml -c tests/config-multiple_mapping-2.yml tests/mapping-conditional-multi.yml > /dev/null
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t xpack-watcher -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml -O output=json -O es=es -O foobar rules/windows/builtin/win_susp_failed_logons_single_source.yml > /dev/null
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t es-qs -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml -o $(TMPOUT) - < tests/collection_repeat.yml > /dev/null
! $(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t xpack-watcher -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml -O output=foobar -O es=es -O foobar rules/windows/builtin/win_susp_failed_logons_single_source.yml > /dev/null
! $(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t es-qs -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml tests/not_existing.yml > /dev/null
! $(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t es-qs -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml tests/invalid_yaml.yml > /dev/null
! $(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t es-qs -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml tests/invalid_sigma-no_identifiers.yml > /dev/null
! $(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t es-qs -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml tests/invalid_sigma-no_condition.yml > /dev/null
! $(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t es-qs -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml tests/invalid_sigma-invalid_identifier_reference.yml > /dev/null
! $(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t es-qs -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml tests/invalid_sigma-invalid_aggregation.yml > /dev/null
! $(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t es-qs -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml tests/invalid_sigma-wrong_identifier_definition.yml > /dev/null
! $(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t es-qs -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml rules/windows/builtin/win_susp_failed_logons_single_source.yml
! $(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t es-qs -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml -o /not_possible rules/windows/sysmon/sysmon_mimikatz_detection_lsass.yml
! $(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t es-qs -c not_existing rules/windows/sysmon/sysmon_mimikatz_detection_lsass.yml
! $(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t es-qs -c tests/invalid_yaml.yml rules/windows/sysmon/sysmon_mimikatz_detection_lsass.yml
! $(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t es-qs -c tests/invalid_config.yml rules/windows/sysmon/sysmon_mimikatz_detection_lsass.yml
test-merge:
tests/test-merge.sh
! coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/merge_sigma tests/not_existing.yml > /dev/null
! $(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/merge_sigma tests/not_existing.yml > /dev/null
test-backend-es-qs:
tests/test-backend-es-qs.py
test-sigma2attack:
coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigma2attack
test-backend-sql:
cd tools && python3 setup.py install
cd tools && $(COVERAGE) run -m pytest tests/test_backend_sql.py tests/test_backend_sqlite.py
build: tools/sigmac tools/merge_sigma tools/sigma/*.py tools/setup.py tools/setup.cfg
test-sigma2attack:
$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigma2attack
build: tools/sigma/*.py tools/setup.py tools/setup.cfg
cd tools && python3 setup.py bdist_wheel sdist
upload-test: build

19
Pipfile
View File

@ -4,16 +4,19 @@ url = "https://pypi.org/simple"
verify_ssl = true
[dev-packages]
coverage = "~=5.0"
yamllint = "~=1.21"
elasticsearch = "~=7.6"
elasticsearch-async = "~=6.2"
pytest = "~=5.4"
colorama = "*"
[packages]
coverage = ">=4.4.1"
yamllint = ">=1.10.0"
elasticsearch = "*"
elasticsearch-async = "*"
pymisp = "*"
PyYAML = ">=3.11"
progressbar2 = "*"
colorama = "*"
requests = "~=2.23"
urllib3 = "~=1.25"
progressbar2 = "~=3.47"
pymisp = "~=2.4.123"
PyYAML = "~=5.1"
[requires]
python_version = "3.6"

401
Pipfile.lock generated
View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
{
"_meta": {
"hash": {
"sha256": "c553c014d5959f8c30ffdb23d4648ff872dbffd5f6f982d8c029a5b4533a959d"
"sha256": "588c969e3c9cf945190a258f9607bbcc53ee9715d34e538b130a852459e4848a"
},
"pipfile-spec": 6,
"requires": {
@ -16,6 +16,147 @@
]
},
"default": {
"attrs": {
"hashes": [
"sha256:08a96c641c3a74e44eb59afb61a24f2cb9f4d7188748e76ba4bb5edfa3cb7d1c",
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],
"version": "==19.3.0"
},
"certifi": {
"hashes": [
"sha256:017c25db2a153ce562900032d5bc68e9f191e44e9a0f762f373977de9df1fbb3",
"sha256:25b64c7da4cd7479594d035c08c2d809eb4aab3a26e5a990ea98cc450c320f1f"
],
"version": "==2019.11.28"
},
"chardet": {
"hashes": [
"sha256:84ab92ed1c4d4f16916e05906b6b75a6c0fb5db821cc65e70cbd64a3e2a5eaae",
"sha256:fc323ffcaeaed0e0a02bf4d117757b98aed530d9ed4531e3e15460124c106691"
],
"version": "==3.0.4"
},
"deprecated": {
"hashes": [
"sha256:408038ab5fdeca67554e8f6742d1521cd3cd0ee0ff9d47f29318a4f4da31c308",
"sha256:8b6a5aa50e482d8244a62e5582b96c372e87e3a28e8b49c316e46b95c76a611d"
],
"version": "==1.2.7"
},
"idna": {
"hashes": [
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"sha256:a068a21ceac8a4d63dbfd964670474107f541babbd2250d61922f029858365fa"
],
"version": "==2.9"
},
"importlib-metadata": {
"hashes": [
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],
"markers": "python_version < '3.8'",
"version": "==1.6.0"
},
"jsonschema": {
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],
"version": "==3.2.0"
},
"progressbar2": {
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"index": "pypi",
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"pymisp": {
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"version": "==2.4.123"
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"pyrsistent": {
"hashes": [
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"version": "==0.16.0"
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"python-dateutil": {
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"version": "==2.8.1"
},
"python-utils": {
"hashes": [
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"version": "==2.4.0"
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"pyyaml": {
"hashes": [
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],
"index": "pypi",
"version": "==5.1"
},
"requests": {
"hashes": [
"sha256:43999036bfa82904b6af1d99e4882b560e5e2c68e5c4b0aa03b655f3d7d73fee",
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],
"index": "pypi",
"version": "==2.23.0"
},
"six": {
"hashes": [
"sha256:236bdbdce46e6e6a3d61a337c0f8b763ca1e8717c03b369e87a7ec7ce1319c0a",
"sha256:8f3cd2e254d8f793e7f3d6d9df77b92252b52637291d0f0da013c76ea2724b6c"
],
"version": "==1.14.0"
},
"urllib3": {
"hashes": [
"sha256:2f3db8b19923a873b3e5256dc9c2dedfa883e33d87c690d9c7913e1f40673cdc",
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],
"index": "pypi",
"version": "==1.25.8"
},
"wrapt": {
"hashes": [
"sha256:b62ffa81fb85f4332a4f609cab4ac40709470da05643a082ec1eb88e6d9b97d7"
],
"version": "==1.12.1"
},
"zipp": {
"hashes": [
"sha256:aa36550ff0c0b7ef7fa639055d797116ee891440eac1a56f378e2d3179e0320b",
"sha256:c599e4d75c98f6798c509911d08a22e6c021d074469042177c8c86fb92eefd96"
],
"version": "==3.1.0"
}
},
"develop": {
"aiohttp": {
"hashes": [
"sha256:1e984191d1ec186881ffaed4581092ba04f7c61582a177b187d3a2f07ed9719e",
@ -47,13 +188,6 @@
],
"version": "==19.3.0"
},
"certifi": {
"hashes": [
"sha256:017c25db2a153ce562900032d5bc68e9f191e44e9a0f762f373977de9df1fbb3",
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],
"version": "==2019.11.28"
},
"chardet": {
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@ -71,55 +205,48 @@
},
"coverage": {
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"sha256:62061e87071497951155cbccee487980524d7abea647a1b2a6eb6b9647df9006",
"sha256:641e329e7f2c01531c45c687efcec8aeca2a78a4ff26d49184dce3d53fc35014",
"sha256:65a7e00c00472cd0f59ae09d2fb8a8aaae7f4a0cf54b2b74f3138d9f9ceb9cb2",
"sha256:6ad6ca45e9e92c05295f638e78cd42bfaaf8ee07878c9ed73e93190b26c125f7",
"sha256:73aa6e86034dad9f00f4bbf5a666a889d17d79db73bc5af04abd6c20a014d9c8",
"sha256:7c9762f80a25d8d0e4ab3cb1af5d9dffbddb3ee5d21c43e3474c84bf5ff941f7",
"sha256:85596aa5d9aac1bf39fe39d9fa1051b0f00823982a1de5766e35d495b4a36ca9",
"sha256:86a0ea78fd851b313b2e712266f663e13b6bc78c2fb260b079e8b67d970474b1",
"sha256:8a620767b8209f3446197c0e29ba895d75a1e272a36af0786ec70fe7834e4307",
"sha256:922fb9ef2c67c3ab20e22948dcfd783397e4c043a5c5fa5ff5e9df5529074b0a",
"sha256:9fad78c13e71546a76c2f8789623eec8e499f8d2d799f4b4547162ce0a4df435",
"sha256:a37c6233b28e5bc340054cf6170e7090a4e85069513320275a4dc929144dccf0",
"sha256:c3fc325ce4cbf902d05a80daa47b645d07e796a80682c1c5800d6ac5045193e5",
"sha256:cda33311cb9fb9323958a69499a667bd728a39a7aa4718d7622597a44c4f1441",
"sha256:db1d4e38c9b15be1521722e946ee24f6db95b189d1447fa9ff18dd16ba89f732",
"sha256:eda55e6e9ea258f5e4add23bcf33dc53b2c319e70806e180aecbff8d90ea24de",
"sha256:f372cdbb240e09ee855735b9d85e7f50730dcfb6296b74b95a3e5dea0615c4c1"
],
"index": "pypi",
"version": "==5.0.3"
},
"deprecated": {
"hashes": [
"sha256:408038ab5fdeca67554e8f6742d1521cd3cd0ee0ff9d47f29318a4f4da31c308",
"sha256:8b6a5aa50e482d8244a62e5582b96c372e87e3a28e8b49c316e46b95c76a611d"
],
"version": "==1.2.7"
"version": "==5.0.4"
},
"elasticsearch": {
"hashes": [
"sha256:1815ee1377e7d3cf32770738a70785fe4ab1f05be28336a330ed71cb295a7c6c",
"sha256:2a0ca516378ae9b87ac840e7bb529ec508f3010360dd9feed605dff2a898aff5"
"sha256:d228b2d37ac0865f7631335268172dbdaa426adec1da3ed006dddf05134f89c8",
"sha256:f4bb05cfe55cf369bdcb4d86d0129d39d66a91fd9517b13cd4e4231fbfcf5c81"
],
"index": "pypi",
"version": "==7.5.1"
"version": "==7.6.0"
},
"elasticsearch-async": {
"hashes": [
@ -131,10 +258,10 @@
},
"idna": {
"hashes": [
"sha256:c357b3f628cf53ae2c4c05627ecc484553142ca23264e593d327bcde5e9c3407",
"sha256:ea8b7f6188e6fa117537c3df7da9fc686d485087abf6ac197f9c46432f7e4a3c"
"sha256:7588d1c14ae4c77d74036e8c22ff447b26d0fde8f007354fd48a7814db15b7cb",
"sha256:a068a21ceac8a4d63dbfd964670474107f541babbd2250d61922f029858365fa"
],
"version": "==2.8"
"version": "==2.9"
},
"idna-ssl": {
"hashes": [
@ -145,40 +272,47 @@
},
"importlib-metadata": {
"hashes": [
"sha256:06f5b3a99029c7134207dd882428a66992a9de2bef7c2b699b5641f9886c3302",
"sha256:b97607a1a18a5100839aec1dc26a1ea17ee0d93b20b0f008d80a5a050afb200b"
"sha256:2a688cbaa90e0cc587f1df48bdc97a6eadccdcd9c35fb3f976a09e3b5016d90f",
"sha256:34513a8a0c4962bc66d35b359558fd8a5e10cd472d37aec5f66858addef32c1e"
],
"markers": "python_version < '3.8'",
"version": "==1.5.0"
"version": "==1.6.0"
},
"jsonschema": {
"more-itertools": {
"hashes": [
"sha256:4e5b3cf8216f577bee9ce139cbe72eca3ea4f292ec60928ff24758ce626cd163",
"sha256:c8a85b28d377cc7737e46e2d9f2b4f44ee3c0e1deac6bf46ddefc7187d30797a"
"sha256:5dd8bcf33e5f9513ffa06d5ad33d78f31e1931ac9a18f33d37e77a180d393a7c",
"sha256:b1ddb932186d8a6ac451e1d95844b382f55e12686d51ca0c68b6f61f2ab7a507"
],
"version": "==3.2.0"
"version": "==8.2.0"
},
"multidict": {
"hashes": [
"sha256:13f3ebdb5693944f52faa7b2065b751cb7e578b8dd0a5bb8e4ab05ad0188b85e",
"sha256:26502cefa86d79b86752e96639352c7247846515c864d7c2eb85d036752b643c",
"sha256:4fba5204d32d5c52439f88437d33ad14b5f228e25072a192453f658bddfe45a7",
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"sha256:5eee66f882ab35674944dfa0d28b57fa51e160b4dce0ce19e47f495fdae70703",
"sha256:63810343ea07f5cd86ba66ab66706243a6f5af075eea50c01e39b4ad6bc3c57a",
"sha256:6bd10adf9f0d6a98ccc792ab6f83d18674775986ba9bacd376b643fe35633357",
"sha256:83c6ddf0add57c6b8a7de0bc7e2d656be3eefeff7c922af9a9aae7e49f225625",
"sha256:93166e0f5379cf6cd29746989f8a594fa7204dcae2e9335ddba39c870a287e1c",
"sha256:9a7b115ee0b9b92d10ebc246811d8f55d0c57e82dbb6a26b23c9a9a6ad40ce0c",
"sha256:a38baa3046cce174a07a59952c9f876ae8875ef3559709639c17fdf21f7b30dd",
"sha256:a6d219f49821f4b2c85c6d426346a5d84dab6daa6f85ca3da6c00ed05b54022d",
"sha256:a8ed33e8f9b67e3b592c56567135bb42e7e0e97417a4b6a771e60898dfd5182b",
"sha256:d7d428488c67b09b26928950a395e41cc72bb9c3d5abfe9f0521940ee4f796d4",
"sha256:dcfed56aa085b89d644af17442cdc2debaa73388feba4b8026446d168ca8dad7",
"sha256:f29b885e4903bd57a7789f09fe9d60b6475a6c1a4c0eca874d8558f00f9d4b51"
"sha256:317f96bc0950d249e96d8d29ab556d01dd38888fbe68324f46fd834b430169f1",
"sha256:42f56542166040b4474c0c608ed051732033cd821126493cf25b6c276df7dd35",
"sha256:4b7df040fb5fe826d689204f9b544af469593fb3ff3a069a6ad3409f742f5928",
"sha256:544fae9261232a97102e27a926019100a9db75bec7b37feedd74b3aa82f29969",
"sha256:620b37c3fea181dab09267cd5a84b0f23fa043beb8bc50d8474dd9694de1fa6e",
"sha256:6e6fef114741c4d7ca46da8449038ec8b1e880bbe68674c01ceeb1ac8a648e78",
"sha256:7774e9f6c9af3f12f296131453f7b81dabb7ebdb948483362f5afcaac8a826f1",
"sha256:85cb26c38c96f76b7ff38b86c9d560dea10cf3459bb5f4caf72fc1bb932c7136",
"sha256:a326f4240123a2ac66bb163eeba99578e9d63a8654a59f4688a79198f9aa10f8",
"sha256:ae402f43604e3b2bc41e8ea8b8526c7fa7139ed76b0d64fc48e28125925275b2",
"sha256:aee283c49601fa4c13adc64c09c978838a7e812f85377ae130a24d7198c0331e",
"sha256:b51249fdd2923739cd3efc95a3d6c363b67bbf779208e9f37fd5e68540d1a4d4",
"sha256:bb519becc46275c594410c6c28a8a0adc66fe24fef154a9addea54c1adb006f5",
"sha256:c2c37185fb0af79d5c117b8d2764f4321eeb12ba8c141a95d0aa8c2c1d0a11dd",
"sha256:dc561313279f9d05a3d0ffa89cd15ae477528ea37aa9795c4654588a3287a9ab",
"sha256:e439c9a10a95cb32abd708bb8be83b2134fa93790a4fb0535ca36db3dda94d20",
"sha256:fc3b4adc2ee8474cb3cd2a155305d5f8eda0a9c91320f83e55748e1fcb68f8e3"
],
"version": "==4.7.4"
"version": "==4.7.5"
},
"packaging": {
"hashes": [
"sha256:3c292b474fda1671ec57d46d739d072bfd495a4f51ad01a055121d81e952b7a3",
"sha256:82f77b9bee21c1bafbf35a84905d604d5d1223801d639cf3ed140bd651c08752"
],
"version": "==20.3"
},
"pathspec": {
"hashes": [
@ -187,65 +321,51 @@
],
"version": "==0.7.0"
},
"progressbar2": {
"pluggy": {
"hashes": [
"sha256:7538d02045a1fd3aa2b2834bfda463da8755bd3ff050edc6c5ddff3bc616215f",
"sha256:eb774d1e0d03ea4730f381c13c2c6ae7abb5ddfb14d8321d7a58a61aa708f0d0"
"sha256:15b2acde666561e1298d71b523007ed7364de07029219b604cf808bfa1c765b0",
"sha256:966c145cd83c96502c3c3868f50408687b38434af77734af1e9ca461a4081d2d"
],
"version": "==0.13.1"
},
"py": {
"hashes": [
"sha256:5e27081401262157467ad6e7f851b7aa402c5852dbcb3dae06768434de5752aa",
"sha256:c20fdd83a5dbc0af9efd622bee9a5564e278f6380fffcacc43ba6f43db2813b0"
],
"version": "==1.8.1"
},
"pyparsing": {
"hashes": [
"sha256:4c830582a84fb022400b85429791bc551f1f4871c33f23e44f353119e92f969f",
"sha256:c342dccb5250c08d45fd6f8b4a559613ca603b57498511740e65cd11a2e7dcec"
],
"version": "==2.4.6"
},
"pytest": {
"hashes": [
"sha256:0e5b30f5cb04e887b91b1ee519fa3d89049595f428c1db76e73bd7f17b09b172",
"sha256:84dde37075b8805f3d1f392cc47e38a0e59518fb46a431cfdaf7cf1ce805f970"
],
"index": "pypi",
"version": "==3.47.0"
},
"pymisp": {
"hashes": [
"sha256:4359953881c70d8c851ba847ebd41fe636ecc155ee92a6b653dcae2d241a6fef",
"sha256:be4c2a2d311ba1aaeb73e1124e8a97ac4eec52a871e02d373c455936095aac72"
],
"index": "pypi",
"version": "==2.4.120"
},
"pyrsistent": {
"hashes": [
"sha256:cdc7b5e3ed77bed61270a47d35434a30617b9becdf2478af76ad2c6ade307280"
],
"version": "==0.15.7"
},
"python-dateutil": {
"hashes": [
"sha256:73ebfe9dbf22e832286dafa60473e4cd239f8592f699aa5adaf10050e6e1823c",
"sha256:75bb3f31ea686f1197762692a9ee6a7550b59fc6ca3a1f4b5d7e32fb98e2da2a"
],
"version": "==2.8.1"
},
"python-utils": {
"hashes": [
"sha256:34aaf26b39b0b86628008f2ae0ac001b30e7986a8d303b61e1357dfcdad4f6d3",
"sha256:e25f840564554eaded56eaa395bca507b0b9e9f0ae5ecb13a8cb785305c56d25"
],
"version": "==2.3.0"
"version": "==5.4.1"
},
"pyyaml": {
"hashes": [
"sha256:059b2ee3194d718896c0ad077dd8c043e5e909d9180f387ce42012662a4946d6",
"sha256:1cf708e2ac57f3aabc87405f04b86354f66799c8e62c28c5fc5f88b5521b2dbf",
"sha256:24521fa2890642614558b492b473bee0ac1f8057a7263156b02e8b14c88ce6f5",
"sha256:4fee71aa5bc6ed9d5f116327c04273e25ae31a3020386916905767ec4fc5317e",
"sha256:70024e02197337533eef7b85b068212420f950319cc8c580261963aefc75f811",
"sha256:74782fbd4d4f87ff04159e986886931456a1894c61229be9eaf4de6f6e44b99e",
"sha256:940532b111b1952befd7db542c370887a8611660d2b9becff75d39355303d82d",
"sha256:cb1f2f5e426dc9f07a7681419fe39cee823bb74f723f36f70399123f439e9b20",
"sha256:dbbb2379c19ed6042e8f11f2a2c66d39cceb8aeace421bfc29d085d93eda3689",
"sha256:e3a057b7a64f1222b56e47bcff5e4b94c4f61faac04c7c4ecb1985e18caa3994",
"sha256:e9f45bd5b92c7974e59bcd2dcc8631a6b6cc380a904725fce7bc08872e691615"
"sha256:1adecc22f88d38052fb787d959f003811ca858b799590a5eaa70e63dca50308c",
"sha256:436bc774ecf7c103814098159fbb84c2715d25980175292c648f2da143909f95",
"sha256:460a5a4248763f6f37ea225d19d5c205677d8d525f6a83357ca622ed541830c2",
"sha256:5a22a9c84653debfbf198d02fe592c176ea548cccce47553f35f466e15cf2fd4",
"sha256:7a5d3f26b89d688db27822343dfa25c599627bc92093e788956372285c6298ad",
"sha256:9372b04a02080752d9e6f990179a4ab840227c6e2ce15b95e1278456664cf2ba",
"sha256:a5dcbebee834eaddf3fa7366316b880ff4062e4bcc9787b78c7fbb4a26ff2dd1",
"sha256:aee5bab92a176e7cd034e57f46e9df9a9862a71f8f37cad167c6fc74c65f5b4e",
"sha256:c51f642898c0bacd335fc119da60baae0824f2cde95b0330b56c0553439f0673",
"sha256:c68ea4d3ba1705da1e0d85da6684ac657912679a649e8868bd850d2c299cce13",
"sha256:e23d0cc5299223dcc37885dae624f382297717e459ea24053709675a976a3e19"
],
"index": "pypi",
"version": "==5.3"
},
"requests": {
"hashes": [
"sha256:11e007a8a2aa0323f5a921e9e6a2d7e4e67d9877e85773fba9ba6419025cbeb4",
"sha256:9cf5292fcd0f598c671cfc1e0d7d1a7f13bb8085e9a590f48c010551dc6c4b31"
],
"version": "==2.22.0"
"version": "==5.1"
},
"six": {
"hashes": [
@ -268,21 +388,23 @@
"sha256:2f3db8b19923a873b3e5256dc9c2dedfa883e33d87c690d9c7913e1f40673cdc",
"sha256:87716c2d2a7121198ebcb7ce7cccf6ce5e9ba539041cfbaeecfb641dc0bf6acc"
],
"index": "pypi",
"version": "==1.25.8"
},
"wrapt": {
"wcwidth": {
"hashes": [
"sha256:565a021fd19419476b9362b05eeaa094178de64f8361e44468f9e9d7843901e1"
"sha256:cafe2186b3c009a04067022ce1dcd79cb38d8d65ee4f4791b8888d6599d1bbe1",
"sha256:ee73862862a156bf77ff92b09034fc4825dd3af9cf81bc5b360668d425f3c5f1"
],
"version": "==1.11.2"
"version": "==0.1.9"
},
"yamllint": {
"hashes": [
"sha256:7318e189027951983c3cb4d6bcaa1e75deef7c752320ca3ce84e407f2551e8ce",
"sha256:76912b6262fd7e0815d7b14c4c2bb2642c754d0aa38f2d3e4b4e21c77872a3bf"
"sha256:09d554bafc57beb22b01619c94e1ba0e8fbb016fa9c1b35ddc68d7bfc16d177f",
"sha256:7e1e698b3d344b64bc46cbe8c4df7dfdfe7c00ed1a8d1c851ecd5b552d93d193"
],
"index": "pypi",
"version": "==1.20.0"
"version": "==1.21.0"
},
"yarl": {
"hashes": [
@ -308,11 +430,10 @@
},
"zipp": {
"hashes": [
"sha256:ccc94ed0909b58ffe34430ea5451f07bc0c76467d7081619a454bf5c98b89e28",
"sha256:feae2f18633c32fc71f2de629bfb3bd3c9325cd4419642b1f1da42ee488d9b98"
"sha256:aa36550ff0c0b7ef7fa639055d797116ee891440eac1a56f378e2d3179e0320b",
"sha256:c599e4d75c98f6798c509911d08a22e6c021d074469042177c8c86fb92eefd96"
],
"version": "==2.1.0"
"version": "==3.1.0"
}
},
"develop": {}
}
}

View File

@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Generic Signature Format for SIEM Systems
# What is Sigma
Sigma is a generic and open signature format that allows you to describe relevant log events in a straight forward manner. The rule format is very flexible, easy to write and applicable to any type of log file. The main purpose of this project is to provide a structured form in which researchers or analysts can describe their once developed detection methods and make them shareable with others.
Sigma is a generic and open signature format that allows you to describe relevant log events in a straightforward manner. The rule format is very flexible, easy to write and applicable to any type of log file. The main purpose of this project is to provide a structured form in which researchers or analysts can describe their once developed detection methods and make them shareable with others.
Sigma is for log files what [Snort](https://www.snort.org/) is for network traffic and [YARA](https://github.com/VirusTotal/yara) is for files.
@ -88,9 +88,9 @@ Sysmon: Web Shell Detection
Windows 'Security' Eventlog: Suspicious Number of Failed Logons from a Single Source Workstation
![sigma_rule example5](./images/Sigma_rule_example5.png)
# Sigma Tools
# Sigma Tools
## Sigmac
## Sigmac
Sigmac converts sigma rules into queries or inputs of the supported targets listed below. It acts as a frontend to the
Sigma library that may be used to integrate Sigma support in other projects. Further, there's `merge_sigma.py` which
@ -98,9 +98,9 @@ merges multiple YAML documents of a Sigma rule collection into simple Sigma rule
### Usage
```
```bash
usage: sigmac [-h] [--recurse] [--filter FILTER]
[--target {arcsight,es-qs,es-dsl,kibana,xpack-watcher,elastalert,graylog,limacharlie,logpoint,grep,netwitness,powershell,qradar,qualys,splunk,splunkxml,sumologic,fieldlist,wdatp}]
[--target {arcsight,es-qs,es-dsl,kibana,xpack-watcher,elastalert,graylog,limacharlie,logpoint,grep,netwitness,powershell,qradar,qualys,splunk,splunkxml,sumologic,fieldlist,mdatp,ee-outliers}]
[--target-list] [--config CONFIG] [--output OUTPUT]
[--backend-option BACKEND_OPTION] [--defer-abort]
[--ignore-backend-errors] [--verbose] [--debug]
@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ optional arguments:
tag that must appear in the rules tag list, case-
insensitive matching. Multiple log source
specifications are AND linked.
--target {arcsight,es-qs,es-dsl,kibana,xpack-watcher,elastalert,graylog,limacharlie,logpoint,grep,netwitness,powershell,qradar,qualys,splunk,splunkxml,sumologic,fieldlist,wdatp}, -t {arcsight,es-qs,es-dsl,kibana,xpack-watcher,elastalert,graylog,limacharlie,logpoint,grep,netwitness,powershell,qradar,qualys,splunk,splunkxml,sumologic,fieldlist,wdatp}
--target {arcsight,es-qs,es-dsl,kibana,xpack-watcher,elastalert,graylog,limacharlie,logpoint,grep,netwitness,powershell,qradar,qualys,splunk,splunkxml,sumologic,fieldlist,mdatp}, -t {arcsight,es-qs,es-dsl,kibana,xpack-watcher,elastalert,graylog,limacharlie,logpoint,grep,netwitness,powershell,qradar,qualys,splunk,splunkxml,sumologic,fieldlist,mdatp}
Output target format
--target-list, -l List available output target formats
--config CONFIG, -c CONFIG
@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ tools/sigmac -t splunk -c ~/my-splunk-mapping.yml -c tools/config/generic/window
* [Kibana](https://www.elastic.co/de/products/kibana)
* [Elastic X-Pack Watcher](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/x-pack/current/xpack-alerting.html)
* [Logpoint](https://www.logpoint.com)
* [Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection (WDATP)](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/windowsforbusiness/windows-atp)
* [Microsoft Defender Advanced Threat Protection (MDATP)](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/windows/microsoft-defender-atp)
* [Azure Sentinel / Azure Log Analytics](https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/services/azure-sentinel/)
* [Sumologic](https://www.sumologic.com/)
* [ArcSight](https://software.microfocus.com/en-us/products/siem-security-information-event-management/overview)
@ -201,11 +201,13 @@ tools/sigmac -t splunk -c ~/my-splunk-mapping.yml -c tools/config/generic/window
* [PowerShell](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/scripting/getting-started/getting-started-with-windows-powershell?view=powershell-6)
* [Grep](https://www.gnu.org/software/grep/manual/grep.html) with Perl-compatible regular expression support
* [LimaCharlie](https://limacharlie.io)
* [ee-outliers](https://github.com/NVISO-BE/ee-outliers)
* [Structured Threat Information Expression (STIX)](https://oasis-open.github.io/cti-documentation/stix/intro.html)
Current work-in-progress
* [Splunk Data Models](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/Splunk/7.1.0/Knowledge/Aboutdatamodels)
New targets are continuously developed. You can get a list of supported targets with `sigmac --target-list` or `sigmac -l`.
New targets are continuously developed. You can get a list of supported targets with `sigmac --lists` or `sigmac -l`.
### Requirements
@ -337,7 +339,7 @@ The content of this repository is released under the following licenses:
* The toolchain (everything under `tools/`) is licensed under the [GNU Lesser General Public License](https://www.gnu.org/licenses/lgpl-3.0.en.html).
* The [Sigma specification](https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/wiki) is public domain.
* Everything else, especially the rules contained in the `rules/` directory is released under the [GNU General Public License](https://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-3.0.en.html).
* Everything else, especially the rules contained in the `rules/` directory is released under the [Detection Rule License (DRL) 1.0](https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/blob/master/LICENSE.Detection.Rules.md).
# Credits
@ -345,4 +347,8 @@ This is a private project mainly developed by Florian Roth and Thomas Patzke wit
# Info Graphic
## Overview
![sigmac_info_graphic](./images/sigma_infographic_lq.png)
## Coverage Illustration
![sigmac_coverage](./images/Sigma_Coverage.png)

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@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
# Remove all hunks from a patch that don't add the id attribute to minimize the impact (removed
# comments etc.) of sigma-uuid script.
# comments etc.) of sigma_uuid script.
#
# Usually used as follows:
# 1. Add UUIDs to rules:
# tools/sigma-uuid -er rules
# tools/sigma_uuid -er rules
# 2. Generate and filter patch
# git diff | contrib/filter-uuid-patch > rule-uuid.diff
# 3. Reset to previous state

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@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ def get_rule_as_sumologic(file):
return "".join(output)
if args.help:
parser_print_help()
parser.print_help()
if args.conf:
with open(args.conf, 'r') as ymlfile:

BIN
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@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
# _____ __ __ ___ __
# / ___/__ ___/ / / |/ /__ ___/ /__
# / (_ / _ \/ _ / / /|_/ / _ \/ _ / -_)
# \___/\___/\_,_/ /_/ /_/\___/\_,_/\__/_
# / __(_)__ ___ _ ___ _ / _ \__ __/ /__
# _\ \/ / _ `/ ' \/ _ `/ / , _/ // / / -_)
# /___/_/\_, /_/_/_/\_,_/ /_/|_|\_,_/_/\__/
# /___/ IDDQD
#
# Florian Roth
# May 2020
# v0.3
#
# A Proof-of-Concept with the most effective search queries
title: Godmode Sigma Rule
id: def6caac-a999-4fc9-8800-cfeff700ba98
description: 'PoC rule to detect malicious activity - following the principle: if you had only one shot, what would you look for?'
status: experimental
author: Florian Roth
date: 2019/12/22
modified: 2020/05/18
level: high
action: global
---
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
# Different suspicious or malicious command line parameters
selection_plain:
CommandLine|contains:
- ' -NoP ' # Often used in malicious PowerShell commands
- ' -W Hidden ' # Often used in malicious PowerShell commands
- ' -decode ' # Used with certutil
- ' /decode ' # Used with certutil
- ' -e* JAB' # PowerShell encoded commands
- ' -e* SUVYI' # PowerShell encoded commands
- ' -e* SQBFAFgA' # PowerShell encoded commands
- ' -e* aWV4I' # PowerShell encoded commands
- ' -e* IAB' # PowerShell encoded commands
- ' -e* PAA' # PowerShell encoded commands
- ' -e* aQBlAHgA' # PowerShell encoded commands
- 'vssadmin delete shadows' # Ransomware
- 'reg SAVE HKLM\SAM' # save registry SAM - syskey extraction
- ' -ma ' # ProcDump
- 'Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run' # Run key in command line - often in combination with REG ADD
- '.downloadstring(' # PowerShell download command
- '.downloadfile(' # PowerShell download command
- ' /ticket:' # Rubeus
- ' sekurlsa' # Mimikatz
- ' p::d ' # Mimikatz
- ';iex(' # PowerShell IEX
- 'schtasks* /create *AppData' # Scheduled task creation pointing to AppData
- ' comsvcs.dll,MiniDump' # Process dumping method apart from procdump
- ' comsvcs.dll,#24' # Process dumping method apart from procdump
selection_parent_child:
ParentImage|contains:
# Office Dropper Detection
- '\WINWORD.EXE'
- '\EXCEL.EXE'
- '\POWERPNT.exe'
- '\MSPUB.exe'
- '\VISIO.exe'
- '\OUTLOOK.EXE'
Image|contains:
- '\cmd.exe'
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\wscript.exe'
- '\cscript.exe'
- '\schtasks.exe'
- '*\scrcons.exe'
- '\regsvr32.exe'
- '\hh.exe'
- '\wmic.exe'
- '\mshta.exe'
- '\msiexec.exe'
- '\forfiles.exe'
- '\AppData\'
selection_webshells:
Image|contains:
- '\apache*'
- '\tomcat*'
- '\w3wp.exe'
- '\php-cgi.exe'
- '\nginx.exe'
- '\httpd.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'whoami'
- 'net user '
- 'ping -n '
- 'systeminfo'
- '&cd&echo'
- 'cd /d ' # https://www.computerhope.com/cdhlp.htm
# Running whoami as LOCAL_SYSTEM (usually after privilege escalation)
selection_whoami:
Image|contains: '\whoami.exe'
User: 'NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM'
condition: 1 of them
---
logsource:
product: windows
service: sysmon
detection:
selection_file_creation:
EventID: 11
TargetFilename|contains:
- '.dmp' # dump process memory
- 'Desktop\how' # Ransomware
- 'Desktop\decrypt' # Ransomware
selection_registry_modifications:
EventID:
- 12
- 13
TargetObject|contains:
- 'UserInitMprLogonScript' # persistence
- '\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\' # persistence
selection_registry_run:
EventID:
- 12
- 13
TargetObject|contains:
- '\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\' # persistence
- '\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce\' # persistence
Details|contains:
- 'AppData'
- '\Users\Public\'
- '\Temp\'
- 'powershell'
- 'wscript'
- 'cscript'
condition: 1 of them
---
logsource:
product: windows
service: system
detection:
# Malicious service installs
selection:
EventID: 7045
ServiceName|contains:
- 'WCESERVICE'
- 'WCE SERVICE'
- 'winexesvc'
- 'DumpSvc'
- 'pwdump'
- 'gsecdump'
- 'cachedump'
condition:
1 of them

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@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ description: Detects process reimaging defense evasion technique
# where
# selection1: ImageFileName != selection1: OriginalFileName
# selection1: ParentProcessGuid = selection2: ProcessGuid
# selection1: Image = selection2: TargetFileName
# selection1: Image = selection2: TargetFilename
# and new field ImageFileName is coming from enrichment
# selection1: Image = ^.+\\<ImageFileName>$
# Rule must trigger if selection1 and selection2 both occurs in timeframe of 120 sec.
@ -45,4 +45,4 @@ detection:
EventID: 11
fields:
- ProcessGuid
- TargetFileName
- TargetFilename

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@ -5,20 +5,22 @@ author: vitaliy0x1
date: 2020/01/21
description: Detects disabling, deleting and updating of a Trail
references:
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/best-practices-security.html
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/best-practices-security.html
logsource:
service: cloudtrail
service: cloudtrail
detection:
selection_source:
- eventSource: cloudtrail.amazonaws.com
events:
- eventName:
- StopLogging
- UpdateTrail
- DeleteTrail
condition: selection_source AND events
selection_source:
- eventSource: cloudtrail.amazonaws.com
events:
- eventName:
- StopLogging
- UpdateTrail
- DeleteTrail
condition: selection_source AND events
level: medium
falsepositives:
- Valid change in a Trail
tags:
- attack.t1089
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1089
- attack.t1562.001

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@ -5,17 +5,19 @@ author: vitaliy0x1
date: 2020/01/21
description: Detects AWS Config Service disabling
logsource:
service: cloudtrail
service: cloudtrail
detection:
selection_source:
- eventSource: config.amazonaws.com
events:
- eventName:
- DeleteDeliveryChannel
- StopConfigurationRecorder
condition: selection_source AND events
selection_source:
- eventSource: config.amazonaws.com
events:
- eventName:
- DeleteDeliveryChannel
- StopConfigurationRecorder
condition: selection_source AND events
level: high
falsepositives:
- Valid change in AWS Config Service
tags:
- attack.t1089
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1089
- attack.t1562.001

View File

@ -21,3 +21,4 @@ falsepositives:
- Valid changes to the startup script
tags:
- attack.t1064
- attack.t1059

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@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
title: AWS EC2 VM Export Failure
id: 54b9a76a-3c71-4673-b4b3-2edb4566ea7b
status: experimental
description: An attempt to export an AWS EC2 instance has been detected. A VM Export might indicate an attempt to extract information from an instance.
references:
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vm-import/latest/userguide/vmexport.html#export-instance
author: Diogo Braz
date: 2020/04/16
tags:
- attack.collection
- attack.t1005
- attack.exfiltration
- attack.t1537
level: low
logsource:
service: cloudtrail
detection:
selection:
eventName: 'CreateInstanceExportTask'
eventSource: 'ec2.amazonaws.com'
filter1:
errorMessage: '*'
filter2:
errorCode: '*'
filter3:
eventName: 'ConsoleLogin'
responseElements: '*Failure*'
condition: selection and (filter1 or filter2 or filter3)

View File

@ -18,4 +18,6 @@ level: high
falsepositives:
- Valid change in the GuardDuty (e.g. to ignore internal scanners)
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1089
- attack.t1562.001

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@ -30,8 +30,6 @@ tags:
- NIST CSF 1.1 PR.AC-7
- NIST CSF 1.1 PR.DS-1
- NIST CSF 1.1 PR.DS-2
- NIST CSF 1.1 PR.PT-3
- NIST CSF 1.1 PR.PT-3
- ISO 27002-2013 A.9.2.1
- ISO 27002-2013 A.9.2.2
- ISO 27002-2013 A.9.2.3

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@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ tags:
- attack.s0003
- attack.t1156
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1546.004
author: Peter Matkovski
logsource:
product: linux

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@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ references:
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1054
- attack.t1562.006
author: Mikhail Larin, oscd.community
status: experimental
date: 2019/10/25

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@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
title: Creation Of An User Account
id: 759d0d51-bc99-4b5e-9add-8f5b2c8e7512
status: experimental
description: Detects the creation of a new user account. According to MITRE ATT&CK, "such accounts may be used for persistence that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system"
references:
- 'MITRE Attack technique T1136; Create Account '
date: 2020/05/18
tags:
- attack.t1136
- attack.persistence
author: Marie Euler
logsource:
product: linux
service: auditd
detection:
selection:
type: 'SYSCALL'
exe: '*/useradd'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Admin activity
level: medium

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@ -6,11 +6,11 @@ author: E.M. Anhaus (orignally from Atomic Blue Detections, Tony Lambert), oscd.
date: 2019/10/24
modified: 2019/11/11
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1055/T1055.yaml
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1574.006/T1574.006.yaml
- https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics/fd9b987a-1101-4ed3-bda6-a70300eaf57e.html
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1055
- attack.t1574.006
logsource:
product: linux
service: auditd

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@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ references:
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1054
- attack.t1562.006
author: Mikhail Larin, oscd.community
status: experimental
date: 2019/10/25

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@ -6,7 +6,10 @@ description: Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an executable, leg
author: Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community
date: 2019/10/21
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1036/T1036.yaml
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1036.003/T1036.003.yaml
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1036.003
logsource:
product: linux
service: auditd
@ -19,6 +22,3 @@ detection:
a3: '*/crond'
condition: selection
level: medium
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1036

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@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
title: Suspicious C2 Activities
id: f7158a64-6204-4d6d-868a-6e6378b467e0
status: experimental
description: Detects suspicious activities as declared by Florian Roth in its 'Best Practice Auditd Configuration'. This includes the detection of the following commands; wget, curl, base64, nc, netcat, ncat, ssh, socat, wireshark, rawshark, rdesktop, nmap. These commands match a few techniques from the tactics "Command and Control", including not exhaustively the following; Application Layer Protocol (T1071), Non-Application Layer Protocol (T1095), Data Encoding (T1132)
references:
- 'https://github.com/Neo23x0/auditd'
date: 2020/05/18
tags:
- attack.command_and_control
author: Marie Euler
logsource:
product: linux
service: auditd
detection:
selection:
key:
- 'susp_activity'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Admin or User activity
level: medium

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@ -4,6 +4,9 @@ status: experimental
description: Detects relevant commands often related to malware or hacking activity
references:
- Internal Research - mostly derived from exploit code including code in MSF
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.004
date: 2017/12/12
author: Florian Roth
logsource:

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@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ status: experimental
description: Detects posible command execution by web application/web shell
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1100
- attack.t1505.003
references:
- personal experience
author: Ilyas Ochkov, Beyu Denis, oscd.community

View File

@ -1,13 +1,15 @@
title: Data Compressed
id: a3b5e3e9-1b49-4119-8b8e-0344a01f21ee
status: experimental
description: An adversary may compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that is collected prior to exfiltration in order to make it portable and minimize the amount
of data sent over the network
description: An adversary may compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that is collected prior to exfiltration in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network
author: Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community
date: 2019/10/21
modified: 2019/11/04
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1002/T1002.yaml
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1560.001/T1560.001.yaml
tags:
- attack.exfiltration
- attack.t1560.001
logsource:
product: linux
service: auditd
@ -27,6 +29,3 @@ detection:
falsepositives:
- Legitimate use of archiving tools by legitimate user
level: low
tags:
- attack.exfiltration
- attack.t1002

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@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ references:
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.g0020
- attack.t1059
- attack.t1059.004
author: Florian Roth
date: 2017/04/09
logsource:

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@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ description: Detects removing immutable file attribute
status: experimental
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1222
- attack.t1222.002
author: Jakob Weinzettl, oscd.community
date: 2019/09/23
logsource:
@ -20,4 +20,4 @@ falsepositives:
- Administrator interacting with immutable files (for instance backups)
level: medium
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1222/T1222.yaml
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1222.002/T1222.002.yaml

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@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
title: Remote File Copy
id: 7a14080d-a048-4de8-ae58-604ce58a795b
description: Detects the use of tools that copy files from or to remote systems
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/
author: Ömer Günal
date: 2020/06/18
tags:
- attack.command_and_control
- attack.lateral_movement
- attack.t1105
level: low
logsource:
product: linux
detection:
keywords:
- Scp|contains:
- 'scp * *@*:*'
- 'scp *@*:* *'
- Rsync|contains:
- 'rsync -r *@*:* *'
- 'rsync -r * *@*:*'
- Sftp|contains:
- 'sftp *@*:* *'
condition: keywords
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administration activities

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@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
title: File or Folder Permissions Change
description: Detects
description: Detects
id: 74c01ace-0152-4094-8ae2-6fd776dd43e5
status: experimental
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1222
- attack.t1222.002
author: Jakob Weinzettl, oscd.community
date: 2019/09/23
logsource:
@ -21,4 +21,4 @@ falsepositives:
- User interracting with files permissions (normal/daily behaviour)
level: low
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1222/T1222.yaml
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1222.002/T1222.002.yaml

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@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ description: Detects a reload or a start of a service
status: experimental
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1501
- attack.t1543.002
author: Jakob Weinzettl, oscd.community
date: 2019/09/23
logsource:
@ -23,5 +23,5 @@ falsepositives:
- Legitimate reconfiguration of service
level: low
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1501/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1501/T1501.yaml
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1543.002/T1543.002.yaml

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@ -2,19 +2,27 @@ title: Clear Command History
id: fdc88d25-96fb-4b7c-9633-c0e417fdbd4e
status: experimental
description: Clear command history in linux which is used for defense evasion.
# Example config for this one (place it in .bash_profile):
# (is_empty=false; inotifywait -m .bash_history | while read file; do if [ $(wc -l <.bash_history) -lt 1 ]; then if [ "$is_empty" = false ]; then logger -i -p local5.info -t empty_bash_history "$USER : ~/.bash_history is empty "; is_empty=true; fi; else is_empty=false; fi; done ) &
# It monitors the size of .bash_history and log the words "empty_bash_history" whenever a previously not empty bash_history becomes empty
# We define an empty file as a document with 0 or 1 lines (it can be a line with only one space character for example)
# It has two advantages over the version suggested by Patrick Bareiss :
# - it is not relative to the exact command used to clear .bash_history : for instance Caldera uses "> .bash_history" to clear the history and this is not one the commands listed here. We can't be exhaustive for all the possibilities !
# - the method suggested by Patrick Bareiss logs all the commands entered directly in a bash shell. therefore it may miss some events (for instance it doesn't log the commands launched from a Caldera agent). Here if .bash_history is cleared, it will always be detected
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1146/T1146.yaml
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1146/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1070.003/T1070.003.yaml
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/003/
- https://www.hackers-arise.com/single-post/2016/06/20/Covering-your-BASH-Shell-Tracks-AntiForensics
author: Patrick Bareiss
date: 2019/03/24
modified: 2020/07/13
logsource:
product: linux
detection:
keywords:
- 'rm *bash_history'
- 'echo "" > *bash_history'
- 'cat /dev/null > *bash_history'
- 'cat /dev/null > *bash_history'
- 'ln -sf /dev/null *bash_history'
- 'truncate -s0 *bash_history'
# - 'unset HISTFILE' # prone to false positives
@ -22,10 +30,11 @@ detection:
- 'history -c'
- 'history -w'
- 'shred *bash_history'
- 'empty_bash_history'
condition: keywords
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1146
- attack.t1070.003

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@ -8,8 +8,8 @@ references:
author: Patrick Bareiss
date: 2019/04/05
tags:
- attack.privilege_escalation
- attack.t1068
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.004
level: medium
logsource:
product: linux

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@ -6,6 +6,9 @@ references:
- https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/master/modules/exploits/multi/http/struts_code_exec_exception_delegator.rb#L121
- http://pastebin.com/FtygZ1cg
- https://artkond.com/2017/03/23/pivoting-guide/
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.004
author: Florian Roth
date: 2017/08/21
modified: 2019/02/05
@ -24,11 +27,11 @@ detection:
- 'socat -O /tmp/*'
- 'socat tcp-connect*'
- '*echo binary >>*'
# Malware
# Malware
- '*wget *; chmod +x*'
- '*wget *; chmod 777 *'
- '*cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt*'
# Apache Struts in-the-wild exploit codes
# Apache Struts in-the-wild exploit codes
- '*stop;service iptables stop;*'
- '*stop;SuSEfirewall2 stop;*'
- 'chmod 777 2020*'

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@ -4,6 +4,9 @@ status: experimental
description: Detects suspicious shell commands or program code that may be exected or used in command line to establish a reverse shell
references:
- https://alamot.github.io/reverse_shells/
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.004
author: Florian Roth
date: 2019/04/02
logsource:

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@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
title: Guacamole Two Users Sharing Session Anomaly
status: experimental
id: 1edd77db-0669-4fef-9598-165bda82826d
description: Detects suspicious session with two users present
references:
- https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/apache-guacamole-rce/
author: Florian Roth
date: 2020/07/03
logsource:
product: linux
service: guacamole
detection:
selection:
- '(2 users now present)'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high

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@ -3,12 +3,15 @@ id: 8ec2c8b4-557a-4121-b87c-5dfb3a602fae
description: Detects suspicious command sequence that JexBoss
references:
- https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/AR18-312A
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.004
author: Florian Roth
date: 2017/08/24
logsource:
product: linux
detection:
selection1:
selection1:
- 'bash -c /bin/bash'
selection2:
- '&/dev/tcp/'

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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
title: Suspicious SSHD Error
title: Suspicious OpenSSH Daemon Error
id: e76b413a-83d0-4b94-8e4c-85db4a5b8bdc
description: Detects suspicious SSH / SSHD error messages that indicate a fatal or suspicious error that could be caused by exploiting attempts
references:
@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ references:
- https://github.com/ossec/ossec-hids/blob/master/etc/rules/sshd_rules.xml
author: Florian Roth
date: 2017/06/30
modified: 2020/05/15
logsource:
product: linux
service: sshd

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@ -1,31 +1,32 @@
title: Cisco Clear Logs
id: ceb407f6-8277-439b-951f-e4210e3ed956
status: experimental
description: Clear command history in network OS which is used for defense evasion.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1146/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/
author: Austin Clark
date: 2019/08/12
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1146
- attack.t1070
logsource:
product: cisco
service: aaa
category: accounting
fields:
- src
- CmdSet
- User
- Privilege_Level
- Remote_Address
detection:
keywords:
- 'clear logging'
- 'clear archive'
condition: keywords
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administrators may run these commands.
level: high
title: Cisco Clear Logs
id: ceb407f6-8277-439b-951f-e4210e3ed956
status: experimental
description: Clear command history in network OS which is used for defense evasion.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1146/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/
author: Austin Clark
date: 2019/08/12
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1146
- attack.t1070
- attack.t1070.003
logsource:
product: cisco
service: aaa
category: accounting
fields:
- src
- CmdSet
- User
- Privilege_Level
- Remote_Address
detection:
keywords:
- 'clear logging'
- 'clear archive'
condition: keywords
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administrators may run these commands.
level: high

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@ -1,39 +1,40 @@
title: Cisco Collect Data
id: cd072b25-a418-4f98-8ebc-5093fb38fe1a
status: experimental
description: Collect pertinent data from the configuration files
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1081/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1005/
author: Austin Clark
date: 2019/08/11
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.credential_access
- attack.collection
- attack.t1087
- attack.t1003
- attack.t1081
- attack.t1005
logsource:
product: cisco
service: aaa
category: accounting
fields:
- src
- CmdSet
- User
- Privilege_Level
- Remote_Address
detection:
keywords:
- 'show running-config'
- 'show startup-config'
- 'show archive config'
- 'more'
condition: keywords
falsepositives:
- Commonly run by administrators.
level: low
title: Cisco Collect Data
id: cd072b25-a418-4f98-8ebc-5093fb38fe1a
status: experimental
description: Collect pertinent data from the configuration files
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1081/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1005/
author: Austin Clark
date: 2019/08/11
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.credential_access
- attack.collection
- attack.t1087
- attack.t1003
- attack.t1081
- attack.t1005
- attack.t1552.001
logsource:
product: cisco
service: aaa
category: accounting
fields:
- src
- CmdSet
- User
- Privilege_Level
- Remote_Address
detection:
keywords:
- 'show running-config'
- 'show startup-config'
- 'show archive config'
- 'more'
condition: keywords
falsepositives:
- Commonly run by administrators.
level: low

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@ -1,33 +1,35 @@
title: Cisco Crypto Commands
id: 1f978c6a-4415-47fb-aca5-736a44d7ca3d
status: experimental
description: Show when private keys are being exported from the device, or when new certificates are installed.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1145/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1130/
author: Austin Clark
date: 2019/08/12
tags:
- attack.credential_access
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1130
- attack.t1145
logsource:
product: cisco
service: aaa
category: accounting
fields:
- src
- CmdSet
- User
- Privilege_Level
- Remote_Address
detection:
keywords:
- 'crypto pki export'
- 'crypto pki import'
- 'crypto pki trustpoint'
condition: keywords
falsepositives:
- Not commonly run by administrators. Also whitelist your known good certificates.
level: high
title: Cisco Crypto Commands
id: 1f978c6a-4415-47fb-aca5-736a44d7ca3d
status: experimental
description: Show when private keys are being exported from the device, or when new certificates are installed.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1145/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1130/
author: Austin Clark
date: 2019/08/12
tags:
- attack.credential_access
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1130
- attack.t1145
- attack.t1553.004
- attack.t1552.004
logsource:
product: cisco
service: aaa
category: accounting
fields:
- src
- CmdSet
- User
- Privilege_Level
- Remote_Address
detection:
keywords:
- 'crypto pki export'
- 'crypto pki import'
- 'crypto pki trustpoint'
condition: keywords
falsepositives:
- Not commonly run by administrators. Also whitelist your known good certificates.
level: high

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@ -1,29 +1,30 @@
title: Cisco Disabling Logging
id: 9e8f6035-88bf-4a63-96b6-b17c0508257e
status: experimental
description: Turn off logging locally or remote
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1089
author: Austin Clark
date: 2019/08/11
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1089
logsource:
product: cisco
service: aaa
category: accounting
fields:
- src
- CmdSet
- User
- Privilege_Level
- Remote_Address
detection:
keywords:
- 'no logging'
- 'no aaa new-model'
condition: keywords
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Cisco Disabling Logging
id: 9e8f6035-88bf-4a63-96b6-b17c0508257e
status: experimental
description: Turn off logging locally or remote
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1089
author: Austin Clark
date: 2019/08/11
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1089
- attack.t1562.001
logsource:
product: cisco
service: aaa
category: accounting
fields:
- src
- CmdSet
- User
- Privilege_Level
- Remote_Address
detection:
keywords:
- 'no logging'
- 'no aaa new-model'
condition: keywords
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high

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@ -1,46 +1,46 @@
title: Cisco Discovery
id: 9705a6a1-6db6-4a16-a987-15b7151e299b
status: experimental
description: Find information about network devices that are not stored in config files.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/
author: Austin Clark
date: 2019/08/12
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1083
- attack.t1201
- attack.t1057
- attack.t1018
- attack.t1082
- attack.t1016
- attack.t1049
- attack.t1033
- attack.t1124
logsource:
product: cisco
service: aaa
category: accounting
fields:
- src
- CmdSet
- User
- Privilege_Level
- Remote_Address
detection:
keywords:
- 'dir'
- 'show processes'
- 'show arp'
- 'show cdp'
- 'show version'
- 'show ip route'
- 'show ip interface'
- 'show ip sockets'
- 'show users'
- 'show ssh'
- 'show clock'
condition: keywords
falsepositives:
- Commonly used by administrators for troubleshooting
level: low
title: Cisco Discovery
id: 9705a6a1-6db6-4a16-a987-15b7151e299b
status: experimental
description: Find information about network devices that are not stored in config files.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/
author: Austin Clark
date: 2019/08/12
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1083
- attack.t1201
- attack.t1057
- attack.t1018
- attack.t1082
- attack.t1016
- attack.t1049
- attack.t1033
- attack.t1124
logsource:
product: cisco
service: aaa
category: accounting
fields:
- src
- CmdSet
- User
- Privilege_Level
- Remote_Address
detection:
keywords:
- 'dir'
- 'show processes'
- 'show arp'
- 'show cdp'
- 'show version'
- 'show ip route'
- 'show ip interface'
- 'show ip sockets'
- 'show users'
- 'show ssh'
- 'show clock'
condition: keywords
falsepositives:
- Commonly used by administrators for troubleshooting
level: low

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@ -1,28 +1,28 @@
title: Cisco Denial of Service
id: d94a35f0-7a29-45f6-90a0-80df6159967c
status: experimental
description: Detect a system being shutdown or put into different boot mode
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1495/
author: Austin Clark
date: 2019/08/15
tags:
- attack.impact
- attack.t1499
- attack.t1495
logsource:
product: cisco
service: aaa
category: accounting
fields:
- CmdSet
detection:
keywords:
- 'shutdown'
- 'config-register 0x2100'
- 'config-register 0x2142'
condition: keywords
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administrators may run these commands, though rarely.
level: medium
title: Cisco Denial of Service
id: d94a35f0-7a29-45f6-90a0-80df6159967c
status: experimental
description: Detect a system being shutdown or put into different boot mode
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1495/
author: Austin Clark
date: 2019/08/15
tags:
- attack.impact
- attack.t1499
- attack.t1495
logsource:
product: cisco
service: aaa
category: accounting
fields:
- CmdSet
detection:
keywords:
- 'shutdown'
- 'config-register 0x2100'
- 'config-register 0x2142'
condition: keywords
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administrators may run these commands, though rarely.
level: medium

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@ -1,31 +1,34 @@
title: Cisco Show Commands Input
id: 71d65515-c436-43c0-841b-236b1f32c21e
status: experimental
description: See what files are being deleted from flash file systems
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1107/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1488/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1487/
author: Austin Clark
date: 2019/08/12
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.impact
- attack.t1107
- attack.t1488
- attack.t1487
logsource:
product: cisco
service: aaa
category: accounting
fields:
- CmdSet
detection:
keywords:
- 'erase'
- 'delete'
- 'format'
condition: keywords
falsepositives:
- Will be used sometimes by admins to clean up local flash space.
level: medium
title: Cisco Show Commands Input
id: 71d65515-c436-43c0-841b-236b1f32c21e
status: experimental
description: See what files are being deleted from flash file systems
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1107/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1488/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1487/
author: Austin Clark
date: 2019/08/12
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.impact
- attack.t1107
- attack.t1488
- attack.t1487
- attack.t1561.002
- attack.t1070.004
- attack.t1561.001
logsource:
product: cisco
service: aaa
category: accounting
fields:
- CmdSet
detection:
keywords:
- 'erase'
- 'delete'
- 'format'
condition: keywords
falsepositives:
- Will be used sometimes by admins to clean up local flash space.
level: medium

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@ -1,29 +1,30 @@
title: Cisco Show Commands Input
id: b094d9fb-b1ad-4650-9f1a-fb7be9f1d34b
status: experimental
description: See what commands are being input into the device by other people, full credentials can be in the history
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1139/
author: Austin Clark
date: 2019/08/11
tags:
- attack.collection
- attack.credential_access
- attack.t1139
- attack.t1056
logsource:
product: cisco
service: aaa
category: accounting
fields:
- CmdSet
detection:
keywords:
- 'show history'
- 'show history all'
- 'show logging'
condition: keywords
falsepositives:
- Not commonly run by administrators, especially if remote logging is configured.
level: medium
title: Cisco Show Commands Input
id: b094d9fb-b1ad-4650-9f1a-fb7be9f1d34b
status: experimental
description: See what commands are being input into the device by other people, full credentials can be in the history
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1139/
author: Austin Clark
date: 2019/08/11
tags:
- attack.collection
- attack.credential_access
- attack.t1139
- attack.t1056
- attack.t1552.003
logsource:
product: cisco
service: aaa
category: accounting
fields:
- CmdSet
detection:
keywords:
- 'show history'
- 'show history all'
- 'show logging'
condition: keywords
falsepositives:
- Not commonly run by administrators, especially if remote logging is configured.
level: medium

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@ -1,27 +1,27 @@
title: Cisco Local Accounts
id: 6d844f0f-1c18-41af-8f19-33e7654edfc3
status: experimental
description: Find local accounts being created or modified as well as remote authentication configurations
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/
author: Austin Clark
date: 2019/08/12
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1136
- attack.t1098
logsource:
product: cisco
service: aaa
category: accounting
fields:
- CmdSet
detection:
keywords:
- 'username'
- 'aaa'
condition: keywords
falsepositives:
- When remote authentication is in place, this should not change often.
level: high
title: Cisco Local Accounts
id: 6d844f0f-1c18-41af-8f19-33e7654edfc3
status: experimental
description: Find local accounts being created or modified as well as remote authentication configurations
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/
author: Austin Clark
date: 2019/08/12
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1136
- attack.t1098
logsource:
product: cisco
service: aaa
category: accounting
fields:
- CmdSet
detection:
keywords:
- 'username'
- 'aaa'
condition: keywords
falsepositives:
- When remote authentication is in place, this should not change often.
level: high

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@ -1,38 +1,41 @@
title: Cisco Modify Configuration
id: 671ffc77-50a7-464f-9e3d-9ea2b493b26b
status: experimental
description: Modifications to a config that will serve an adversary's impacts or persistence
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1100/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1168/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1493/
author: Austin Clark
date: 2019/08/12
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege_escalation
- attack.impact
- attack.t1493
- attack.t1100
- attack.t1168
- attack.t1490
logsource:
product: cisco
service: aaa
category: accounting
fields:
- CmdSet
detection:
keywords:
- 'ip http server'
- 'ip https server'
- 'kron policy-list'
- 'kron occurrence'
- 'policy-list'
- 'access-list'
- 'ip access-group'
- 'archive maximum'
condition: keywords
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administrators may run these commands.
level: medium
title: Cisco Modify Configuration
id: 671ffc77-50a7-464f-9e3d-9ea2b493b26b
status: experimental
description: Modifications to a config that will serve an adversary's impacts or persistence
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1100/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1168/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1493/
author: Austin Clark
date: 2019/08/12
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege_escalation
- attack.impact
- attack.t1493
- attack.t1100
- attack.t1168
- attack.t1490
- attack.t1565.002
- attack.t1505
- attack.t1053
logsource:
product: cisco
service: aaa
category: accounting
fields:
- CmdSet
detection:
keywords:
- 'ip http server'
- 'ip https server'
- 'kron policy-list'
- 'kron occurrence'
- 'policy-list'
- 'access-list'
- 'ip access-group'
- 'archive maximum'
condition: keywords
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administrators may run these commands.
level: medium

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@ -1,39 +1,41 @@
title: Cisco Stage Data
id: 5e51acb2-bcbe-435b-99c6-0e3cd5e2aa59
status: experimental
description: Various protocols maybe used to put data on the device for exfil or infil
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1002/
author: Austin Clark
date: 2019/08/12
tags:
- attack.collection
- attack.lateral_movement
- attack.command_and_control
- attack.exfiltration
- attack.impact
- attack.t1074
- attack.t1105
- attack.t1492
- attack.t1002
logsource:
product: cisco
service: aaa
category: accounting
fields:
- CmdSet
detection:
keywords:
- 'tftp'
- 'rcp'
- 'puts'
- 'copy'
- 'configure replace'
- 'archive tar'
condition: keywords
falsepositives:
- Generally used to copy configs or IOS images.
level: low
title: Cisco Stage Data
id: 5e51acb2-bcbe-435b-99c6-0e3cd5e2aa59
status: experimental
description: Various protocols maybe used to put data on the device for exfil or infil
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1002/
author: Austin Clark
date: 2019/08/12
tags:
- attack.collection
- attack.lateral_movement
- attack.command_and_control
- attack.exfiltration
- attack.impact
- attack.t1074
- attack.t1105
- attack.t1492
- attack.t1002
- attack.t1560
- attack.t1565.001
logsource:
product: cisco
service: aaa
category: accounting
fields:
- CmdSet
detection:
keywords:
- 'tftp'
- 'rcp'
- 'puts'
- 'copy'
- 'configure replace'
- 'archive tar'
condition: keywords
falsepositives:
- Generally used to copy configs or IOS images.
level: low

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@ -1,27 +1,27 @@
title: Cisco Sniffing
id: b9e1f193-d236-4451-aaae-2f3d2102120d
status: experimental
description: Show when a monitor or a span/rspan is setup or modified
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040
author: Austin Clark
date: 2019/08/11
tags:
- attack.credential_access
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1040
logsource:
product: cisco
service: aaa
category: accounting
fields:
- CmdSet
detection:
keywords:
- 'monitor capture point'
- 'set span'
- 'set rspan'
condition: keywords
falsepositives:
- Admins may setup new or modify old spans, or use a monitor for troubleshooting.
level: medium
title: Cisco Sniffing
id: b9e1f193-d236-4451-aaae-2f3d2102120d
status: experimental
description: Show when a monitor or a span/rspan is setup or modified
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040
author: Austin Clark
date: 2019/08/11
tags:
- attack.credential_access
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1040
logsource:
product: cisco
service: aaa
category: accounting
fields:
- CmdSet
detection:
keywords:
- 'monitor capture point'
- 'set span'
- 'set rspan'
condition: keywords
falsepositives:
- Admins may setup new or modify old spans, or use a monitor for troubleshooting.
level: medium

View File

@ -7,17 +7,18 @@ references:
- https://github.com/samratashok/nishang/blob/master/Backdoors/DNS_TXT_Pwnage.ps1
tags:
- attack.t1071
- attack.t1071.004
author: Markus Neis
date: 2018/08/08
logsource:
category: dns
detection:
selection:
record_type: 'TXT'
answer:
- '*IEX*'
- '*Invoke-Expression*'
- '*cmd.exe*'
record_type: 'TXT'
answer:
- '*IEX*'
- '*Invoke-Expression*'
- '*cmd.exe*'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown

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@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
title: Domain User Enumeration Network Recon 01
description: Domain user and group enumeration via network reconnaissance. Seen in APT 29 and other common tactics and actors. Detects a set of RPC (remote procedure calls) used to enumerate a domain controller. The rule was created based off the datasets and hackathon from https://github.com/OTRF/detection-hackathon-apt29
id: 66a0bdc6-ee04-441a-9125-99d2eb547942
references:
- "https://github.com/OTRF/detection-hackathon-apt29"
- "https://github.com/OTRF/detection-hackathon-apt29/issues/37"
author: 'Nate Guagenti (@neu5ron), Open Threat Research (OTR)'
date: 2020/05/03
modified: 2020/05/03
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1087
- attack.t1082
logsource:
product: zeek
service: dce_rpc
detection:
selection:
operation:
#- LsarEnumerateTrustedDomains #potentially too many FPs, removing. caused by netlogon
#- SamrEnumerateDomainsInSamServer #potentially too many FPs, removing. #method obtains a listing of all domains hosted by the server side of this protocol. This value is a cookie that the server can use to continue an enumeration on a subsequent call
- LsarLookupNames3 #method translates a batch of security principal names to their SID form
- LsarLookupSids3 #translates a batch of security principal SIDs to their name forms
- SamrGetGroupsForUser #obtains a listing of groups that a user is a member of
- SamrLookupIdsInDomain #method translates a set of RIDs into account names
- SamrLookupNamesInDomain #method translates a set of account names into a set of RIDs
- SamrQuerySecurityObject #method queries the access control on a server, domain, user, group, or alias object
- SamrQueryInformationGroup #obtains attributes from a group object
timeframe: 30s
condition: selection | count(operation) by src_ip > 4
falsepositives:
- Devices that may do authentication like a VPN or a firewall that looksup IPs to username
- False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment
level: medium
status: experimental

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@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
title: MITRE BZAR Indicators for ATT&CK Execution
id: b640c0b8-87f8-4daa-aef8-95a24261dd1d
description: 'Windows DCE-RPC functions which indicate an ATT&CK-like Execution techniques on the remote system. All credit for the Zeek mapping of the suspicious endpoint/operation field goes to MITRE.'
author: '@neu5ron, SOC Prime'
date: 2020/03/19
references:
- https://github.com/mitre-attack/bzar#indicators-for-attck-execution
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1035
- attack.t1047
- attack.t1053
- attack.t1053.002
- attack.t1569.002
logsource:
product: zeek
service: dce_rpc
detection:
op1:
endpoint: 'JobAdd'
operation: 'atsvc'
op2:
endpoint: 'ITaskSchedulerService'
operation: 'SchRpcEnableTask'
op3:
endpoint: 'ITaskSchedulerService'
operation: 'SchRpcRegisterTask'
op4:
endpoint: 'ITaskSchedulerService'
operation: 'SchRpcRun'
op5:
endpoint: 'IWbemServices'
operation: 'ExecMethod'
op6:
endpoint: 'IWbemServices'
operation: 'ExecMethodAsync'
op7:
endpoint: 'svcctl'
operation: 'CreateServiceA'
op8:
endpoint: 'svcctl'
operation: 'CreateServiceW'
op9:
endpoint: 'svcctl'
operation: 'StartServiceA'
op10:
endpoint: 'svcctl'
operation: 'StartServiceW'
condition: 1 of them
falsepositives:
- 'Windows administrator tasks or troubleshooting'
- 'Windows management scripts or software'
level: medium

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@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
title: MITRE BZAR Indicators for ATT&CK Persistence
id: 53389db6-ba46-48e3-a94c-e0f2cefe1583
description: 'Windows DCE-RPC functions which indicate an ATT&CK-like Persistence techniques on the remote system. All credit for the Zeek mapping of the suspicious endpoint/operation field goes to MITRE.'
author: '@neu5ron, SOC Prime'
date: 2020/03/19
references:
- https://github.com/mitre-attack/bzar#indicators-for-attck-persistence
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1004
- attack.t1547.004
logsource:
product: zeek
service: dce_rpc
detection:
op1:
endpoint: 'spoolss'
operation: 'RpcAddMonitor'
op2:
endpoint: 'spoolss'
operation: 'RpcAddPrintProcessor'
op3:
endpoint: 'IRemoteWinspool'
operation: 'RpcAsyncAddMonitor'
op4:
endpoint: 'IRemoteWinspool'
operation: 'RpcAsyncAddPrintProcessor'
op5:
endpoint: 'ISecLogon'
operation: 'SeclCreateProcessWithLogonW'
op6:
endpoint: 'ISecLogon'
operation: 'SeclCreateProcessWithLogonExW'
condition: 1 of them
falsepositives:
- 'Windows administrator tasks or troubleshooting'
- 'Windows management scripts or software'
level: medium

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@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
title: Executable from Webdav
description: "Detects executable access via webdav6. Can be seen in APT 29 such as from the emulated APT 29 hackathon https://github.com/OTRF/detection-hackathon-apt29/"
id: aac2fd97-bcba-491b-ad66-a6edf89c71bf
author: 'SOC Prime, Adam Swan'
references:
- http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2012/06/webdav-server-to-download-custom.html
- https://github.com/OTRF/detection-hackathon-apt29
tags:
- attack.command_and_control
- attack.t1043
- attack.t1571
logsource:
product: zeek
service: http
date: 2020/05/01
detection:
selection_webdav:
- c-useragent: '*WebDAV*'
- c-uri: '*webdav*'
selection_executable:
- resp_mime_types: '*dosexec*'
- c-uri: '*.exe'
condition: selection_webdav AND selection_executable
falsepositives:
- unknown
level: medium
status: experimental

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@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
title: Remote Task Creation via ATSVC Named Pipe - Zeek
id: dde85b37-40cd-4a94-b00c-0b8794f956b5
description: Detects remote task creation via at.exe or API interacting with ATSVC namedpipe
author: 'Samir Bousseaden, @neu5rn'
date: 2020/04/03
references:
- https://github.com/neo23x0/sigma/blob/d42e87edd741dd646db946f30964f331f92f50e6/rules/windows/builtin/win_atsvc_task.yml
tags:
- attack.lateral_movement
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1053
- car.2013-05-004
- car.2015-04-001
- attack.t1053.002
logsource:
product: zeek
service: smb_files
detection:
selection:
path: \\*\IPC$
name: atsvc
#Accesses: '*WriteData*'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- unknown
level: medium

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@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
title: Possible Impacket SecretDump Remote Activity - Zeek
id: 92dae1ed-1c9d-4eff-a567-33acbd95b00e
description: 'Detect AD credential dumping using impacket secretdump HKTL. Based on the SIGMA rules/windows/builtin/win_impacket_secretdump.yml'
author: 'Samir Bousseaden, @neu5ron'
date: 2020/03/19
references:
- https://blog.menasec.net/2019/02/threat-huting-10-impacketsecretdump.html
tags:
- attack.credential_access
- attack.t1003
- attack.t1003.002
- attack.t1003.004
- attack.t1003.003
logsource:
product: zeek
service: smb_files
detection:
selection:
path: '\\*ADMIN$'
name: '*SYSTEM32\\*.tmp'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- 'unknown'
level: high

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@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
title: First Time Seen Remote Named Pipe - Zeek
id: 021310d9-30a6-480a-84b7-eaa69aeb92bb
description: This detection excludes known namped pipes accessible remotely and notify on newly observed ones, may help to detect lateral movement and remote exec using named pipes
author: 'Samir Bousseaden, @neu5ron'
date: 2020/04/02
references:
- https://github.com/neo23x0/sigma/blob/d42e87edd741dd646db946f30964f331f92f50e6/rules/windows/builtin/win_lm_namedpipe.yml
tags:
- attack.lateral_movement
- attack.t1077
- attack.t1021.002
logsource:
product: zeek
service: smb_files
detection:
selection1:
path: \\*\IPC$
selection2:
path: \\*\IPC$
name:
- 'atsvc'
- 'samr'
- 'lsarpc'
- 'winreg'
- 'netlogon'
- 'srvsvc'
- 'protected_storage'
- 'wkssvc'
- 'browser'
- 'netdfs'
- 'svcctl'
- 'spoolss'
- 'ntsvcs'
- 'LSM_API_service'
- 'HydraLsPipe'
- 'TermSrv_API_service'
- 'MsFteWds'
condition: selection1 and not selection2
falsepositives:
- update the excluded named pipe to filter out any newly observed legit named pipe
level: high

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@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
title: Suspicious PsExec Execution - Zeek
id: f1b3a22a-45e6-4004-afb5-4291f9c21166
description: detects execution of psexec or paexec with renamed service name, this rule helps to filter out the noise if psexec is used for legit purposes or if attacker uses a different psexec client other than sysinternal one
author: 'Samir Bousseaden, @neu5ron'
date: 2020/04/02
references:
- https://github.com/neo23x0/sigma/blob/d42e87edd741dd646db946f30964f331f92f50e6/rules/windows/builtin/win_susp_psexec.yml
tags:
- attack.lateral_movement
- attack.t1077
- attack.t1021.002
logsource:
product: zeek
service: smb_files
detection:
selection1:
path: \\*\IPC$
name:
- '*-stdin'
- '*-stdout'
- '*-stderr'
selection2:
name: \\*\IPC$
path: 'PSEXESVC*'
condition: selection1 and not selection2
falsepositives:
- nothing observed so far
level: high

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@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
title: Suspicious Access to Sensitive File Extensions - Zeek
id: 286b47ed-f6fe-40b3-b3a8-35129acd43bc
description: Detects known sensitive file extensions via Zeek
author: 'Samir Bousseaden, @neu5ron'
date: 2020/04/02
references:
- https://github.com/neo23x0/sigma/blob/d42e87edd741dd646db946f30964f331f92f50e6/rules/windows/builtin/win_susp_raccess_sensitive_fext.yml
tags:
- attack.collection
logsource:
product: zeek
service: smb_files
detection:
selection:
name:
- '*.pst'
- '*.ost'
- '*.msg'
- '*.nst'
- '*.oab'
- '*.edb'
- '*.nsf'
- '*.bak'
- '*.dmp'
- '*.kirbi'
- '*\groups.xml'
- '*.rdp'
condition: selection
fields:
- ComputerName
- SubjectDomainName
- SubjectUserName
- RelativeTargetName
falsepositives:
- Help Desk operator doing backup or re-imaging end user machine or pentest or backup software
- Users working with these data types or exchanging message files
level: medium

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@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
title: Transferring Files with Credential Data via Network Shares - Zeek
id: 2e69f167-47b5-4ae7-a390-47764529eff5
description: Transferring files with well-known filenames (sensitive files with credential data) using network shares
author: '@neu5ron, Teymur Kheirkhabarov, oscd.community'
date: 2020/04/02
references:
- https://github.com/neo23x0/sigma/blob/373424f14574facf9e261d5c822345a282b91479/rules/windows/builtin/win_transferring_files_with_credential_data_via_network_shares.yml
tags:
- attack.credential_access
- attack.t1003
- attack.t1003.002
- attack.t1003.001
- attack.t1003.003
logsource:
product: zeek
service: smb_files
detection:
selection:
name:
- '\mimidrv'
- '\lsass'
- '\windows\minidump\'
- '\hiberfil'
- '\sqldmpr'
- '\sam'
- '\ntds.dit'
- '\security'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Transferring sensitive files for legitimate administration work by legitimate administrator
level: medium
status: experimental

View File

@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ references:
tags:
- attack.credential_access
- attack.t1208
- attack.t1558.003
logsource:
product: zeek
service: kerberos

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@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
title: Empire UserAgent URI Combo
id: b923f7d6-ac89-4a50-a71a-89fb846b4aa8
status: experimental
description: Detects user agent and URI paths used by empire agents
references:
- https://github.com/BC-SECURITY/Empire
author: Florian Roth
date: 2020/07/13
logsource:
category: proxy
detection:
selection:
c-useragent: 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko'
cs-uri-query:
- '/admin/get.php'
- '/news.php'
- '/login/process.php'
cs-method: 'POST'
condition: selection
fields:
- c-uri
- c-ip
falsepositives:
- Valid requests with this exact user agent to server scripts of the defined names
level: high

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@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
title: PwnDrp Access
id: 2b1ee7e4-89b6-4739-b7bb-b811b6607e5e
status: experimental
description: Detects downloads from PwnDrp web servers developed for red team testing and most likely also used for criminal activity
references:
- https://breakdev.org/pwndrop/
author: Florian Roth
date: 2020/04/15
logsource:
category: proxy
detection:
selection:
c-uri|contains: '/pwndrop/'
condition: selection
fields:
- ClientIP
- c-uri
- c-useragent
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: critical

View File

@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ detection:
- '.paste.ee/r/'
- '.pastebin.com/raw/'
- '.hastebin.com/raw/'
- '.ghostbin.co/paste/*/raw/'
condition: selection
fields:
- ClientIP

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@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
title: Turla ComRAT
id: 7857f021-007f-4928-8b2c-7aedbe64bb82
status: experimental
description: Detects Turla ComRAT patterns
references:
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/ESET_Turla_ComRAT.pdf
author: Florian Roth
date: 2020/05/26
tags:
- attack.g0010
logsource:
category: proxy
detection:
selection:
c-uri|contains: '/index/index.php?h='
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: critical

View File

@ -45,6 +45,8 @@ detection:
- 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 9; *' # Suspicious 'Windows NT 9' user agent - used by APT33 malware in 2018
- 'hots scot' # Unkown iOS zero-day implant https://twitter.com/craiu/status/1176437994288484352?s=20
- 'Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 10.0; Windows NT)' # https://blog.telsy.com/meeting-powerband-the-apt33-net-powerton-variant/
- 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) Chrome/28.0.1500.95 Safari/537.36' # Hidden Cobra malware
- 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.2; Win32; rv:47.0)' # Strong Pity loader https://twitter.com/VK_Intel/status/1264185981118406657
condition: selection
fields:
- ClientIP

View File

@ -10,13 +10,13 @@ references:
author: Arnim Rupp, Florian Roth
status: experimental
date: 2020/01/02
modified: 2020/01/15
modified: 2020/03/14
logsource:
category: webserver
description: 'Make sure that your Netscaler appliance logs all kinds of attacks (test with http://your-citrix-gw.net/robots.txt). The directory traversal with ../ might not be needed on certain cloud instances or for authenticated users, so we also check for direct paths. All scripts in portal/scripts are exploitable except logout.pl.'
definition: 'Make sure that your Netscaler appliance logs all kinds of attacks (test with http://your-citrix-gw.net/robots.txt). The directory traversal with ../ might not be needed on certain cloud instances or for authenticated users, so we also check for direct paths. All scripts in portal/scripts are exploitable except logout.pl.'
detection:
selection:
c-uri-path:
c-uri:
- '*/../vpns/*'
- '*/vpns/cfg/smb.conf'
- '*/vpns/portal/scripts/*.pl*'

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@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
title: Citrix ADS Exploitation CVE-2020-8193 CVE-2020-8195
description: Detects exploitation attempt against Citrix Netscaler, Application Delivery Controller (ADS) and Citrix Gateway exploiting vulnerabilities reported as CVE-2020-8193 and CVE-2020-8195
id: 0d0d9a8a-a49e-4e27-b061-7ce4b936cfb7
references:
- https://support.citrix.com/article/CTX276688
- https://research.nccgroup.com/2020/07/10/rift-citrix-adc-vulnerabilities-cve-2020-8193-cve-2020-8195-and-cve-2020-8196-intelligence/
- https://dmaasland.github.io/posts/citrix.html
author: Florian Roth
status: experimental
date: 2020/07/10
tags:
- attack.initial_access
- attack.t1190
logsource:
category: webserver
detection:
selection1:
c-uri|contains:
- '/rapi/filedownload?filter=path:%2F'
selection2:
c-uri|contains|all:
- '/pcidss/report'
- 'type=all_signatures'
- 'sig_name=_default_signature_'
condition: 1 of them
fields:
- client_ip
- vhost
- url
- response
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: critical

View File

@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
title: Oracle WebLogic Exploit
id: 37e8369b-43bb-4bf8-83b6-6dd43bda2000
description: Detects access to a webshell droped into a keytore folder on the WebLogic server
description: Detects access to a webshell dropped into a keystore folder on the WebLogic server
author: Florian Roth
date: 2018/07/22
modified: 2020/03/14
status: experimental
references:
- https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-2894
@ -12,7 +13,7 @@ logsource:
category: webserver
detection:
selection:
c-uri-path:
c-uri:
- '*/config/keystore/*.js*'
condition: selection
fields:
@ -27,5 +28,6 @@ tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege_escalation
- cve.2018-2894
- attack.t1505
level: critical

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@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
title: Confluence Exploitation CVE-2019-3398
id: e9bc39ae-978a-4e49-91ab-5bd481fc668b
status: experimental
description: Detects the exploitation of the Confluence vulnerability described in CVE-2019-3398
references:
- https://devcentral.f5.com/s/articles/confluence-arbitrary-file-write-via-path-traversal-cve-2019-3398-34181
author: Florian Roth
date: 2020/05/26
tags:
- attack.initial_access
- attack.t1190
logsource:
category: webserver
detection:
selection:
cs-method: 'POST'
c-uri|contains|all:
- '/upload.action'
- 'filename=../../../../'
condition: selection
fields:
- c-ip
- c-dns
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: critical

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@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
title: CVE-2020-0688 Exchange Exploitation via Web Log
id: fce2c2e2-0fb5-41ab-a14c-5391e1fd70a5
status: experimental
description: Detects the exploitation of Microsoft Exchange vulnerability as described in CVE-2020-0688
references:
- https://www.trustedsec.com/blog/detecting-cve-20200688-remote-code-execution-vulnerability-on-microsoft-exchange-server/
author: Florian Roth
date: 2020/02/29
logsource:
category: webserver
detection:
selection1:
cs-method: 'GET'
c-uri|contains:
- '/ecp/'
- '/owa/'
selection2:
c-uri|contains: '__VIEWSTATE='
condition: selection1 and selection2
fields:
- c-ip
- c-dns
falsepositives:
- Unknown
tags:
- attack.initial_access
- attack.t1190
level: critical

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@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
title: CVE-2020-5902 F5 BIG-IP Exploitation Attempt
id: 44b53b1c-e60f-4a7b-948e-3435a7918478
status: experimental
description: Detects the exploitation attempt of the vulnerability found in F5 BIG-IP and described in CVE-2020-5902
references:
- https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K52145254
- https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/about/news/f5-fixes-critical-vulnerability-discovered-by-positive-technologies-in-big-ip-application-delivery-controller/
- https://twitter.com/yorickkoster/status/1279709009151434754
- https://www.criticalstart.com/f5-big-ip-remote-code-execution-exploit/
author: Florian Roth
date: 2020/07/05
modified: 2020/07/07
logsource:
category: webserver
detection:
selection_base:
c-uri|contains:
- '/tmui/'
- '/hsqldb'
selection_traversal:
c-uri|contains:
- '..;/'
- '.jsp/..'
condition: selection_base and selection_traversal
fields:
- c-ip
- c-dns
falsepositives:
- Unknown
tags:
- attack.initial_access
- attack.t1190
level: critical

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@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
title: CVE-2020-0688 Exploitation Attempt
id: 7c64e577-d72e-4c3d-9d75-8de6d1f9146a
status: experimental
description: Detects CVE-2020-0688 Exploitation attempts
references:
- https://github.com/Ridter/cve-2020-0688
author: NVISO
date: 2020/02/27
tags:
- attack.t1210
logsource:
category: webserver
detection:
selection:
c-uri|contains|all:
- "/ecp/default.aspx"
- "__VIEWSTATEGENERATOR="
- "__VIEWSTATE="
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high

View File

@ -3,11 +3,12 @@ id: 6fdfc796-06b3-46e8-af08-58f3505318af
description: Detects possible exploitation activity or bugs in a web application
author: Thomas Patzke
date: 2017/02/19
modified: 2020/03/14
logsource:
category: webserver
detection:
selection:
response:
sc-status:
- 400
- 401
- 403

View File

@ -5,11 +5,12 @@ references:
- https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/47297
author: Florian Roth
date: 2019/11/18
modified: 2020/03/14
logsource:
category: webserver
detection:
selection:
c-uri-path: '*?/dana/html5acc/guacamole/*'
c-uri: '*?/dana/html5acc/guacamole/*'
condition: selection
fields:
- client_ip

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@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
title: Webshell ReGeorg Detection Via Web Logs
id: 2ea44a60-cfda-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003
status: experimental
description: Certain strings in the uri_query field when combined with null referer and null user agent can indicate activity associated with the webshell ReGeorg.
author: Cian Heasley
reference:
- https://community.rsa.com/community/products/netwitness/blog/2019/02/19/web-shells-and-netwitness-part-3
- https://github.com/sensepost/reGeorg
date: 2020/08/04
tags:
- attack.privilege_escalation
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1100
- attack.t1505.003
logsource:
category: webserver
detection:
selection:
uri_query|contains:
- '*cmd=read*'
- '*connect&target*'
- '*cmd=connect*'
- '*cmd=disconnect*'
- '*cmd=forward*'
filter:
referer: null
useragent: null
method: POST
condition: selection and filter
fields:
- uri_query
- referer
- method
- useragent
falsepositives:
- web applications that use the same URL parameters as ReGeorg
level: high

View File

@ -1,18 +1,20 @@
title: Persistence and Execution at Scale via GPO Scheduled Task
id: a8f29a7b-b137-4446-80a0-b804272f3da2
description: Detect lateral movement using GPO scheduled task, ususally used to deploy ransomware at scale
description: Detect lateral movement using GPO scheduled task, usually used to deploy ransomware at scale
author: Samir Bousseaden
date: 2019/04/03
references:
- https://twitter.com/menasec1/status/1106899890377052160
- https://www.secureworks.com/blog/ransomware-as-a-distraction
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.lateral_movement
- attack.t1053
- attack.t1053.005
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
description: 'The advanced audit policy setting "Object Access > Audit Detailed File Share" must be configured for Success/Failure'
definition: 'The advanced audit policy setting "Object Access > Audit Detailed File Share" must be configured for Success/Failure'
detection:
selection:
EventID: 5145

View File

@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ detection:
selection:
EventID: 4662
ObjectServer: 'DS'
AccessMask: 0x40000
AccessMask: '0x40000'
ObjectType:
- '19195a5b-6da0-11d0-afd3-00c04fd930c9'
- 'domainDNS'

View File

@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ id: 17d619c1-e020-4347-957e-1d1207455c93
description: Detects potential abuse of Active Directory Replication Service (ADRS) from a non machine account to request credentials.
status: experimental
date: 2019/07/26
modified: 2019/11/10
modified: 2020/03/02
author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g
references:
- https://github.com/Cyb3rWard0g/ThreatHunter-Playbook/tree/master/playbooks/windows/06_credential_access/T1003_credential_dumping/ad_replication_non_machine_account.md
@ -22,7 +22,8 @@ detection:
- '1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2'
- '89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c'
filter:
SubjectUserName|endswith: '$'
- SubjectUserName|endswith: '$'
- SubjectUserName|startswith: 'MSOL_' #https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/hybrid/reference-connect-accounts-permissions#ad-ds-connector-account
condition: selection and not filter
fields:
- ComputerName

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@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
title: AD User Enumeration
id: ab6bffca-beff-4baa-af11-6733f296d57a
description: Detects access to a domain user from a non-machine account
status: experimental
date: 2020/03/30
author: Maxime Thiebaut (@0xThiebaut)
references:
- https://www.specterops.io/assets/resources/an_ace_up_the_sleeve.pdf
- http://www.stuffithoughtiknew.com/2019/02/detecting-bloodhound.html
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/adschema/attributes-all # For further investigation of the accessed properties
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1087
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
definition: Requires the "Read all properties" permission on the user object to be audited for the "Everyone" principal
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4662
ObjectType|contains: # Using contains as the data commonly is structured as "%{bf967aba-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2}"
- 'bf967aba-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2' # The user class (https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/adschema/c-user)
filter:
- SubjectUserName|endswith: '$' # Exclude machine accounts
- SubjectUserName|startswith: 'MSOL_' # https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/hybrid/reference-connect-accounts-permissions#ad-ds-connector-account
condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- Administrators configuring new users.
level: medium

View File

@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ description: Detects access to $ADMIN share
tags:
- attack.lateral_movement
- attack.t1077
- attack.t1021.002
status: experimental
author: Florian Roth
date: 2017/03/04

View File

@ -14,15 +14,15 @@ tags:
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
definition1: 'Requirements: Audit Policy : Account Management > Audit User Account Management, Group Policy : Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Advanced Audit Policy Configuration\Audit Policies\Account Management\Audit User Account Management'
definition2: 'Requirements: Audit Policy : DS Access > Audit Directory Service Changes, Group Policy : Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Advanced Audit Policy Configuration\Audit Policies\DS Access\Audit Directory Service Changes'
definition: 'Requirements: Audit Policy : Account Management > Audit User Account Management, Group Policy : Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Advanced Audit Policy Configuration\Audit Policies\Account Management\Audit User Account Management,
DS Access > Audit Directory Service Changes, Group Policy : Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Advanced Audit Policy Configuration\Audit Policies\DS Access\Audit Directory Service Changes'
detection:
selection1:
EventID: 4738
filter_null:
AllowedToDelegateTo: null
filter1:
AllowedToDelegateTo:
- null
- '-'
AllowedToDelegateTo: '-'
selection2:
EventID: 5136
AttributeLDAPDisplayName: 'msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo'
@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ detection:
selection4:
EventID: 5136
AttributeLDAPDisplayName: 'msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity'
condition: (selection1 and not 1 of filter*) or selection2 or selection3 or selection4
condition: (selection1 and not filter1 and not filter_null) or selection2 or selection3 or selection4
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high

View File

@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ date: 2017/07/30
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1089
- attack.t1562.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
@ -18,9 +19,9 @@ detection:
EventID: 4738
keywords:
Message:
- '*DES*'
- '*Preauth*'
- '*Encrypted*'
- '*DES*'
- '*Preauth*'
- '*Encrypted*'
filters:
Message:
- '*Enabled*'

View File

@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ tags:
- attack.credential_access
- attack.t1003
# Defender Attack Surface Reduction
- attack.t1003.001
logsource:
product: windows_defender
definition: 'Requirements:Enabled Block credential stealing from the Windows local security authority subsystem (lsass.exe) from Attack Surface Reduction (GUID: 9e6c4e1f-7d60-472f-ba1a-a39ef669e4b2)'

View File

@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
title: Mimikatz Use
id: 06d71506-7beb-4f22-8888-e2e5e2ca7fd8
description: This method detects mimikatz keywords in different Eventlogs (some of them only appear in older Mimikatz version that are however still used by different
threat groups)
description: This method detects mimikatz keywords in different Eventlogs (some of them only appear in older Mimikatz version that are however still used by different threat groups)
author: Florian Roth
date: 2017/01/10
modified: 2019/10/11
@ -12,21 +11,25 @@ tags:
- attack.credential_access
- car.2013-07-001
- car.2019-04-004
- attack.t1003.002
- attack.t1003.004
- attack.t1003.001
- attack.t1003.006
logsource:
product: windows
detection:
keywords:
Message:
- "* mimikatz *"
- "* mimilib *"
- "* <3 eo.oe *"
- "* eo.oe.kiwi *"
- "* privilege::debug *"
- "* sekurlsa::logonpasswords *"
- "* lsadump::sam *"
- "* mimidrv.sys *"
- "* p::d *"
- "* s::l *"
- "* mimikatz *"
- "* mimilib *"
- "* <3 eo.oe *"
- "* eo.oe.kiwi *"
- "* privilege::debug *"
- "* sekurlsa::logonpasswords *"
- "* lsadump::sam *"
- "* mimidrv.sys *"
- "* p::d *"
- "* s::l *"
condition: keywords
falsepositives:
- Naughty administrators

View File

@ -17,18 +17,19 @@ tags:
- attack.t1075
- attack.t1114
- attack.t1059
- attack.t1550.002
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection1:
EventID:
- 4776
EventID:
- 4776
Workstation: 'RULER'
selection2:
EventID:
- 4624
- 4625
- 4624
- 4625
WorkstationName: 'RULER'
condition: (1 of selection*)
falsepositives:

View File

@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
title: File Was Not Allowed To Run
id: 401e5d00-b944-11ea-8f9a-00163ecd60ae
description: Detect run not allowed files. Applocker is a very useful tool, especially on servers where unprivileged users have access. For example terminal servers. You need configure applocker and log collect to receive these events.
status: experimental
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1204
- attack.t1086
- attack.t1064
- attack.t1035
references:
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/what-is-applocker
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/using-event-viewer-with-applocker
- https://nxlog.co/documentation/nxlog-user-guide/applocker.html
author: Pushkarev Dmitry
date: 2020/06/28
logsource:
product: windows
service: applocker
detection:
selection:
EventID:
- 8004
- 8007
condition: selection
fields:
- PolicyName
- RuleId
- RuleName
- TargetUser
- TargetProcessId
- FilePath
- FileHash
- Fqbn
falsepositives:
- need tuning applocker or add exceptions in SIEM
level: medium

View File

@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.g0010
- attack.t1050
- attack.t1543.003
date: 2017/03/31
author: Florian Roth
logsource:

View File

@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.g0064
- attack.t1050
- attack.t1543.003
logsource:
product: windows
service: system

View File

@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.g0010
- attack.t1050
- attack.t1543.003
logsource:
product: windows
service: system

View File

@ -11,10 +11,11 @@ tags:
- attack.t1053
- car.2013-05-004
- car.2015-04-001
- attack.t1053.002
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
description: 'The advanced audit policy setting "Object Access > Audit Detailed File Share" must be configured for Success/Failure'
definition: 'The advanced audit policy setting "Object Access > Audit Detailed File Share" must be configured for Success/Failure'
detection:
selection:
EventID: 5145

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