Merge pull request #1873 from austinsonger/spelling

Spelling Fixes
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frack113 2021-08-19 06:15:45 +02:00 committed by GitHub
commit 7bca85e406
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42 changed files with 47 additions and 47 deletions

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@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
title: Azure Kubernetes Secret or Config Object Access
id: 7ee0b4aa-d8d4-4088-b661-20efdf41a04c
description: Identifies when a Kubernetes account access a sensitve objects such as configmaps or secrets.
description: Identifies when a Kubernetes account access a sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets.
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger
status: experimental
date: 2021/08/07

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@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
title: Azure Virtual Network Device Modified or Deleted
id: 15ef3fac-f0f0-4dc4-ada0-660aa72980b3
description: Identifies when a virtual network device is being modified or deleted. This can be a network interface, network virtual applicance, vitual hub, or virtual router.
description: Identifies when a virtual network device is being modified or deleted. This can be a network interface, network virtual appliance, virtual hub, or virtual router.
author: Austin Songer
status: experimental
date: 2021/08/08

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@ -17,4 +17,4 @@ tags:
- attack.impact
- attack.t1565
falsepositives:
- Unkown
- Unknown

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@ -19,4 +19,4 @@ level: medium
tags:
- attack.impact
falsepositives:
- Unkown
- Unknown

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@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
title: Default Cobalt Strike Certificate
id: 7100f7e3-92ce-4584-b7b7-01b40d3d4118
description: Detects the presense of default Cobalt Strike certificate in the HTTPS traffic
description: Detects the presence of default Cobalt Strike certificate in the HTTPS traffic
author: Bhabesh Raj
date: 2021/06/23
references:

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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
title: BabyShark Agent Pattern
id: 304810ed-8853-437f-9e36-c4975c3dfd7e
status: experimental
description: Detects Baby Shark C2 Framework communcation patterns
description: Detects Baby Shark C2 Framework communication patterns
author: Florian Roth
date: 2021/06/09
references:

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@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ logsource:
detection:
selection:
c-useragent|contains:
# Vulnerbility scanner and brute force tools
# Vulnerability scanner and brute force tools
- '(hydra)'
- ' arachni/'
- ' BFAC '

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@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ detection:
- 'metric'
condition: selection1 and selection2
falsepositives:
- Vulnerability Scaning/Pentesting
- Vulnerability Scanning/Pentesting
level: high

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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
title: Exchange Exploitation CVE-2021-28480
id: a2a9d722-0acb-4096-bccc-daaf91a5037b
status: experimental
description: Detects successfull exploitation of Exchange vulnerability as reported in CVE-2021-28480
description: Detects successful exploitation of Exchange vulnerability as reported in CVE-2021-28480
references:
- https://twitter.com/GossiTheDog/status/1392965209132871683?s=20
author: Florian Roth

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@ -21,5 +21,5 @@ fields:
- EventCode
- AccountName
falsepositives:
- unkown
- unknown
level: high

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@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ detection:
- selection and not filter_computer | count(TargetUserName) by IpAddress > 10
falsepositives:
- Vulnerability scanners
- Missconfigured systems
- Misconfigured systems
- Remote administration tools
- VPN terminators
- Multiuser systems like Citrix server farms

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@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ detection:
- selection and not filter_computer | count(TargetUserName) by IpAddress > 10
falsepositives:
- Vulnerability scanners
- Missconfigured systems
- Misconfigured systems
- Remote administration tools
- VPN terminators
- Multiuser systems like Citrix server farms

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@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ detection:
- selection and not filter_computer | count(TargetUserName) by IpAddress > 10
falsepositives:
- Vulnerability scanners
- Missconfigured systems
- Misconfigured systems
- Remote administration tools
- VPN terminators
- Multiuser systems like Citrix server farms

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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
title: Suspicous Remote Logon with Explicit Credentials
title: Suspicious Remote Logon with Explicit Credentials
id: 941e5c45-cda7-4864-8cea-bbb7458d194a
status: experimental
description: Detects suspicious processes logging on with explicit credentials

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@ -24,5 +24,5 @@ detection:
ObjectName: '\Device\ConDrv'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Penetration tests where lateral movement has occured. This event will be created on the target host.
- Penetration tests where lateral movement has occurred. This event will be created on the target host.
level: high

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@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ detection:
EventID: 4104
selection_basic:
ScriptBlockText|contains: 'Get-Keystrokes'
selection_high: # want to run in backgroud and keybord
selection_high: # want to run in background and keyboard
ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
- 'Get-ProcAddress user32.dll GetAsyncKeyState'
- 'Get-ProcAddress user32.dll GetForegroundWindow'

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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
title: Suspicious Export-PfxCertificate
id: aa7a3fce-bef5-4311-9cc1-5f04bb8c308c
status: experimental
description: Detects Commandlet that is used to export certificates from the local certificate store and sometimes used by threat actors to steal provate keys from compromised machines
description: Detects Commandlet that is used to export certificates from the local certificate store and sometimes used by threat actors to steal private keys from compromised machines
references:
- https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-112a
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/pki/export-pfxcertificate

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@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ detection:
- '0x1fffff'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- unkown
- unknown
level: high
tags:
- attack.execution

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@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ detection:
CallTrace|startswith: 'UNKNOWN'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- unkown
- unknown
level: critical
tags:
- attack.execution

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@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ detection:
- 'UNKNOWN'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- unkown
- unknown
level: high
tags:
- attack.execution

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@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
title: Accesschk Usage After Privilege Escalation
id: c625d754-6a3d-4f65-9c9a-536aea960d37
description: Accesschk is an access and privilege audit tool developed by SysInternal and often being used by attacker to verify if a privilege escalation process succesfull or not
description: Accesschk is an access and privilege audit tool developed by SysInternal and often being used by attacker to verify if a privilege escalation process successful or not
status: experimental
author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov (idea), Mangatas Tondang (rule), oscd.community
date: 2020/10/13

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@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
title: Exchange Exploitation Activity
id: bbb2dedd-a0e3-46ab-ba6c-6c82ae7a9aa7
description: Detects activity observed by different researchers to be HAFNIUM group acitivity (or related) on Exchange servers
description: Detects activity observed by different researchers to be HAFNIUM group activity (or related) on Exchange servers
author: Florian Roth
date: 2021/03/09
modified: 2021/03/16

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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
title: ProxyLogon MSExchange OabVirtualDirectory
id: 550d3350-bb8a-4ff3-9533-2ba533f4a1c0
status: experimental
description: Detects specific patterns found after a successful ProxyLogon exploitation in relation to a Commandlet invokation of Set-OabVirtualDirectory
description: Detects specific patterns found after a successful ProxyLogon exploitation in relation to a Commandlet invocation of Set-OabVirtualDirectory
references:
- https://bi-zone.medium.com/hunting-down-ms-exchange-attacks-part-1-proxylogon-cve-2021-26855-26858-27065-26857-6e885c5f197c
author: Florian Roth

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@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
title: Writing Of Malicious Files To The Fonts Folder
id: ae9b0bd7-8888-4606-b444-0ed7410cb728
description: Monitors for the hiding possible malicious files in the C:\Windows\Fonts\ location. This folder doesnt require admin privillege to be written and executed from.
description: Monitors for the hiding possible malicious files in the C:\Windows\Fonts\ location. This folder doesn't require admin privillege to be written and executed from.
references:
- https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/
date: 2020/21/04

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@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ detection:
- 'UpdateDeploymentProvider.dll /ClassId'
condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- Wuaueng.dll which is a module belonging to Microsoft Wnidows Update.
- Wuaueng.dll which is a module belonging to Microsoft Windows Update.
fields:
- CommandLine
level: medium

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@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ detection:
- '.*(?i)winget install (--m|-m).*'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Admin activity installing packages not in the official Microsoft repo. Winget probably wont be used by most users.
- Admin activity installing packages not in the official Microsoft repo. Winget probably won't be used by most users.
fields:
- CommandLine
level: medium

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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
title: Script Event Consumer Spawning Processs
title: Script Event Consumer Spawning Process
id: f6d1dd2f-b8ce-40ca-bc23-062efb686b34
status: experimental
description: Detects a suspicious child process of Script Event Consumer (scrcons.exe).

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@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
title: Suspicious Csi.exe Usage
id: 40b95d31-1afc-469e-8d34-9a3a667d058e
description: Csi.exe is a signed binary from Micosoft that comes with Visual Studio and provides C# interactive capabilities. It can be used to run C# code from a file passed as a parameter in command line. Early version of this utility provided with Microsoft “Roslyn” Community Technology Preview was named 'rcsi.exe'
description: Csi.exe is a signed binary from Microsoft that comes with Visual Studio and provides C# interactive capabilities. It can be used to run C# code from a file passed as a parameter in command line. Early version of this utility provided with Microsoft “Roslyn” Community Technology Preview was named 'rcsi.exe'
status: experimental
author: Konstantin Grishchenko, oscd.community
date: 2020/10/17

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@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
title: Suspicious VBoxDrvInst.exe Parameters
id: b7b19cb6-9b32-4fc4-a108-73f19acfe262
description: Detect VBoxDrvInst.exe run whith parameters allowing processing INF file. This allows to create values in the registry and install drivers.
description: Detect VBoxDrvInst.exe run with parameters allowing processing INF file. This allows to create values in the registry and install drivers.
For example one could use this technique to obtain persistence via modifying one of Run or RunOnce registry keys
status: experimental
author: Konstantin Grishchenko, oscd.community

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@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
title: Remote Code Execute via Winrm.vbs
id: 9df0dd3a-1a5c-47e3-a2bc-30ed177646a0
description: Detects an attempt to execude code or create service on remote host via winrm.vbs.
description: Detects an attempt to execute code or create service on remote host via winrm.vbs.
status: experimental
references:
- https://twitter.com/bohops/status/994405551751815170

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@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ detection:
- '\powershell.exe'
filter_null1:
CommandLine: 'null'
filter_null2: # some backends need the null value in a seperate expression
filter_null2: # some backends need the null value in a separate expression
CommandLine: null
condition: selection and not filter_null1 and not filter_null2
falsepositives:

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@ -27,9 +27,9 @@ detection:
- Image|endswith:
- '\WmiPrvSE.exe'
- '\WerFault.exe'
filter_null1: # some backends need the null value in a seperate expression
filter_null1: # some backends need the null value in a separate expression
LogonId: null
filter_null2: # some backends need the null value in a seperate expression
filter_null2: # some backends need the null value in a separate expression
SubjectLogonId: null
condition: selection and not filter and not filter_null1 and not filter_null2
falsepositives:

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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
title: Office Application Startup - Office Test
id: 3d27f6dd-1c74-4687-b4fa-ca849d128d1c
status: experimental
description: Detects the addition of office test registry that allows a user to specify an arbitrary DLL that will be executed everytime an Office application is started
description: Detects the addition of office test registry that allows a user to specify an arbitrary DLL that will be executed every time an Office application is started
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/002/
author: omkar72

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@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
title: Atbroker Registry Change
id: 9577edbb-851f-4243-8c91-1d5b50c1a39b
description: Detects creation/modification of Assisitive Technology applications and persistance with usage of ATs
description: Detects creation/modification of Assisitive Technology applications and persistence with usage of ATs
author: Mateusz Wydra, oscd.community
references:
- http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2016/07/22/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-42/
@ -18,9 +18,9 @@ logsource:
detection:
creation:
TargetObject|contains: 'Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility\ATs'
persistance:
persistence:
TargetObject|contains: 'Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility\Configuration'
condition: creation or persistance
condition: creation or persistence
falsepositives:
- Creation of non-default, legitimate AT.
level: high

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@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
title: Persistent Outlook Landing Pages
id: 487bb375-12ef-41f6-baae-c6a1572b4dd1
description: Detects the manipulation of persistant URLs which could execute malicious code
description: Detects the manipulation of persistent URLs which could execute malicious code
status: experimental
references:
- https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=70

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@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
title: Persistent Outlook Landing Pages
id: ddd171b5-2cc6-4975-9e78-f0eccd08cc76
description: Detects the manipulation of persistant URLs which can be malicious
description: Detects the manipulation of persistent URLs which can be malicious
status: experimental
references:
- https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=70

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@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ class TestRules(unittest.TestCase):
status_str = self.get_rule_part(file_path=file, part_name="status")
if status_str:
if not status_str in valid_status:
print(Fore.YELLOW + "Rule {} has a invalide 'status' (check wiki).".format(file))
print(Fore.YELLOW + "Rule {} has a invalid 'status' (check wiki).".format(file))
faulty_rules.append(file)
self.assertEqual(faulty_rules, [], Fore.RED +
@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ class TestRules(unittest.TestCase):
print(Fore.YELLOW + "Rule {} has no field 'level'.".format(file))
faulty_rules.append(file)
elif not level_str in valid_level:
print(Fore.YELLOW + "Rule {} has a invalide 'level' (check wiki).".format(file))
print(Fore.YELLOW + "Rule {} has a invalid 'level' (check wiki).".format(file))
faulty_rules.append(file)
self.assertEqual(faulty_rules, [], Fore.RED +
@ -562,7 +562,7 @@ class TestRules(unittest.TestCase):
for key in logsource:
if key.lower() not in valid_logsource:
print(Fore.RED + "Rule {} has a logsource with an invalid field ({})".format(file, key))
valide = False
valid = False
if not valid:
faulty_rules.append(file)

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@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ class DevoBackend(SingleTextQueryBackend):
mapMulti = "has(%s, %s)" # Syntax for field/value conditions. First %s is fieldname, second is value
mapWildcard = "matches(%s, nameglob(%s))" # Syntax for globbing conditions
mapRe = "matches(%s, %s)" # Syntax for regex conditions that already were transformed by SigmaRegularExpressionModifier
mapContains = "toktains(%s, %s, true, true)" # Systax for token value searches
mapContains = "toktains(%s, %s, true, true)" # Syntax for token value searches
mapListValueExpression = "%s or %s" # Syntax for field/value condititons where map value is a list
mapFullTextSearch = "weaktoktains(raw, \"%s\", true, true)" # Expression for full text searches
typedValueExpression = {

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@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ class SigmaRuleFilter:
if self.status not in self.STATES:
raise SigmaRuleFilterParseException("Unknown status '%s' in condition '%s'" % (self.status, cond))
elif cond.startswith("tlp="):
self.tlp = cond[cond.index("=") + 1:].upper() #tlp is allways uppercase
self.tlp = cond[cond.index("=") + 1:].upper() #tlp is always uppercase
elif cond.startswith("target="):
self.target = cond[cond.index("=") + 1:].lower() # lower to make caseinsensitive
elif cond.startswith("logsource="):

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@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ from uuid import uuid4, UUID
import yaml
from sigma.output import SigmaYAMLDumper
argparser = ArgumentParser(description="Assign and verfify UUIDs of Sigma rules")
argparser = ArgumentParser(description="Assign and verify UUIDs of Sigma rules")
argparser.add_argument("--verify", "-V", action="store_true", help="Verify existence and uniqueness of UUID assignments. Exits with error code if verification fails.")
argparser.add_argument("--verbose", "-v", action="store_true", help="Be verbose.")
argparser.add_argument("--recursive", "-r", action="store_true", help="Recurse into directories.")

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@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ def yaml_preserve_order(self, dict_data):
return self.represent_mapping("tag:yaml.org,2002:map", dict_data.items())
def main():
argparser = ArgumentParser(description="Assign and verfify UUIDs of Sigma rules")
argparser = ArgumentParser(description="Assign and verify UUIDs of Sigma rules")
argparser.add_argument("--verify", "-V", action="store_true", help="Verify existence and uniqueness of UUID assignments. Exits with error code if verification fails.")
argparser.add_argument("--verbose", "-v", action="store_true", help="Be verbose.")
argparser.add_argument("--recursive", "-r", action="store_true", help="Recurse into directories.")

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@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ def set_argparser():
available additional fields : title, id, status, description, author, references, fields, falsepositives, level, tags.
This option do not have any effect for backends that already format output : elastalert, kibana, splukxml etc. """)
argparser.add_argument("--output-format", "-oF", choices=["json", "yaml"], help="Use only if you want to have JSON or YAML output (default is raw text)")
argparser.add_argument("--output-extention", "-e", default=None, help="Extention of Output file for filename prefix use")
argparser.add_argument("--output-extention", "-e", default=None, help="Extension of Output file for filename prefix use")
argparser.add_argument("--print0", action="store_true", help="Delimit results by NUL-character")
argparser.add_argument("--backend-option", "-O", action="append", help="Options and switches that are passed to the backend")
argparser.add_argument("--backend-config", "-C", help="Configuration file (YAML format) containing options to pass to the backend")