style: renamed rule files to all lower case

This commit is contained in:
Florian Roth 2018-09-08 10:27:19 +02:00
parent 68896d9294
commit 6f5a73b2e2
4 changed files with 97 additions and 0 deletions

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title: LSASS Access Detected via Attack Surface Reduction
description: Detects Access to LSASS Process
status: experimental
references:
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-exploit-guard/attack-surface-reduction-exploit-guard?WT.mc_id=twitter
author: Markus Neis
date: 2018/08/26
tags:
- attack.credential_access
- attack.t1003
# Defender Attack Surface Reduction
logsource:
product: windows_defender
description: 'Requirements:Enabled Block credential stealing from the Windows local security authority subsystem (lsass.exe) from Attack Surface Reduction (GUID: 9e6c4e1f-7d60-472f-ba1a-a39ef669e4b2)'
detection:
selection:
EventID: 1121
Path: '*\lsass.exe'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Google Chrome GoogleUpdate.exe
- Some Taskmgr.exe related activity
level: high

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title: MSHTA spwaned by SVCHOST as seen in LethalHTA
status: experimental
description: Detects MSHTA.EXE spwaned by SVCHOST described in report
references:
- https://codewhitesec.blogspot.com/2018/07/lethalhta.html
author: Markus Neis
date: 2018/06/07
logsource:
product: windows
service: sysmon
detection:
selection:
EventID: 1
ParentImage: '*\svchost.exe'
Image: '*\mshta.exe'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high

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title: Powershell AMSI Bypass via .NET Reflection
status: experimental
description: Detects Request to amsiInitFailed that can be used to disable AMSI Scanning
references:
- https://twitter.com/mattifestation/status/735261176745988096
- https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/0ced17419e01663a0cd836c9c2eb925e3031ffb5b18ccf35f4dea5d586d0203e?environmentId=120
author: Markus Neis
date: 2018/08/17
logsource:
product: windows
service: sysmon
detection:
selection1:
EventID: 1
CommandLine:
- '*System.Management.Automation.AmsiUtils*'
selection2:
CommandLine:
- '*amsiInitFailed*'
condition: selection1 and selection2
falsepositives:
- Potential Admin Activity
level: high

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title: Detection of PowerShell Execution via DLL
status: experimental
description: Detects PowerShell Strings applied to rundllas seen in PowerShdll.dll
references:
- https://github.com/p3nt4/PowerShdll/blob/master/README.md
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1086
author: Markus Neis
date: 2018/08/25
logsource:
product: windows
service: sysmon
detection:
selection1:
EventID: 1
Image:
- '*\rundll32.exe'
selection2:
EventID: 1
Description:
- '*Windows-Hostprozess (Rundll32)*'
selection3:
EventID: 1
CommandLine:
- '*Default.GetString*'
- '*FromBase64String*'
condition: (selection1 or selection2) and selection3
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high