Merge pull request #695 from cobsec/master

Date typos
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Florian Roth 2020-04-02 10:20:18 +02:00 committed by GitHub
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7 changed files with 8 additions and 8 deletions

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@ -2,8 +2,8 @@ title: MSHTA Suspicious Execution 01
id: cc7abbd0-762b-41e3-8a26-57ad50d2eea3
status: experimental
description: Detection for mshta.exe suspicious execution patterns sometimes involving file polyglotism
date: 22/02/2019
modified: 22/02/2019
date: 2019/02/22
modified: 2019/02/22
author: Diego Perez (@darkquassar), Markus Neis, Swisscom (Improve Rule)
references:
- http://blog.sevagas.com/?Hacking-around-HTA-files

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@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ description: Trickbot enumerates domain/network topology and executes certain co
references:
- https://www.sneakymonkey.net/2019/05/22/trickbot-analysis/
author: David Burkett
date: 12/28/2019
date: 2019/12/28
tags:
- attack.t1482
logsource:

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@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ description: It is extremely abnormal for svchost.exe to spawn without any CLI a
references:
- https://securitybytes.io/blue-team-fundamentals-part-two-windows-processes-759fe15965e2
author: David Burkett
date: 12/28/2019
date: 2019/12/28
tags:
- attack.t1055
logsource:

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@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: Detects the access to processes by other suspicious processes which
few calls in the stack (ntdll.dll --> kernelbase.dll --> unknown) which essentially means that most of the functions required by the process to execute certain
routines are already present in memory, not requiring any calls to external libraries. The latter should also be considered suspicious.
status: experimental
date: 27/10/2019
date: 2019/10/27
author: Perez Diego (@darkquassar), oscd.community
references:
- https://azure.microsoft.com/en-ca/blog/detecting-in-memory-attacks-with-sysmon-and-azure-security-center/

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@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ status: experimental
description: Detects the use of MiniDumpWriteDump API for dumping lsass.exe memory in a stealth way. Tools like ProcessHacker and some attacker tradecract use this
API found in dbghelp.dll or dbgcore.dll. As an example, SilentTrynity C2 Framework has a module that leverages this API to dump the contents of Lsass.exe and
transfer it over the network back to the attacker's machine.
date: 27/10/2019
date: 2019/10/27
modified: 2019/11/13
author: Perez Diego (@darkquassar), oscd.community
references:

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@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ author: Florian Roth, Markus Neis
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1060
date: 2018/25/08
date: 2018/08/25
modified: 2020/02/26
logsource:
product: windows

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@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: Offensive tradecraft is switching away from using APIs like "Create
notes:
- MonitoringHost.exe is a process that loads .NET CLR by default and thus a favorite for process injection for .NET in-memory offensive tools.
status: experimental
date: 27/10/2019
date: 2019/10/27
modified: 2019/11/13
author: Perez Diego (@darkquassar), oscd.community
references: