SigmaHQ/rules/windows/sysmon/sysmon_susp_certutil_command.yml

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title: Suspicious Certutil Command
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status: experimental
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description: Detects a suspicious Microsoft certutil execution with sub commands like 'decode' sub command, which is sometimes used to decode malicious code with the built-in certutil utility
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author: Florian Roth, juju4
references:
- https://twitter.com/JohnLaTwC/status/835149808817991680
- https://twitter.com/subTee/status/888102593838362624
- https://twitter.com/subTee/status/888071631528235010
- https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/pki/2006/11/30/basic-crl-checking-with-certutil/
- https://www.trustedsec.com/2017/07/new-tool-release-nps_payload/
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logsource:
product: windows
service: sysmon
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detection:
selection:
EventID: 1
CommandLine:
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- '*\certutil.exe * -decode *'
- '*\certutil.exe * -decodehex *'
- '*\certutil.exe *-urlcache* http*'
- '*\certutil.exe *-urlcache* ftp*'
- '*\certutil.exe *-URL*'
- '*\certutil.exe *-ping*'
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condition: selection
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fields:
- CommandLine
- ParentCommandLine
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1140
- attack.s0189
- attack.g0007
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falsepositives:
- False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment
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level: high