SigmaHQ/rules-unsupported/win_possible_privilege_escalation_using_rotten_potato.yml

35 lines
1.3 KiB
YAML
Raw Normal View History

title: Detection of Possible Rotten Potato
id: 6c5808ee-85a2-4e56-8137-72e5876a5096
2019-10-27 17:54:07 +00:00
description: Detection of child processes spawned with SYSTEM privileges by parents with LOCAL SERVICE or NETWORK SERVICE privileges
references:
- https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-privilege-escalation-in-windows-environment
- https://foxglovesecurity.com/2016/09/26/rotten-potato-privilege-escalation-from-service-accounts-to-system/
tags:
- attack.privilege_escalation
2020-09-02 00:34:34 +00:00
- attack.t1134 # an old one
- attack.t1134.002
2019-10-27 17:54:07 +00:00
status: experimental
author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov
date: 2019/10/26
2020-09-02 00:34:34 +00:00
modified: 2020/09/01
2019-10-27 17:54:07 +00:00
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
definition: Works only if Enrich Sysmon events with additional information about process in ParentUser check enrichment section
2019-10-27 17:54:07 +00:00
detection:
selection:
ParentUser:
- 'NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK SERVICE'
- 'NT AUTHORITY\LOCAL SERVICE'
User: 'NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM'
rundllexception:
Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
CommandLine|contains: 'DavSetCookie'
2019-10-27 17:54:07 +00:00
condition: selection and not rundllexception
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
enrichment:
- EN_0001_cache_sysmon_event_id_1_info # http://bit.ly/314zc6x
- EN_0002_enrich_sysmon_event_id_1_with_parent_info # http://bit.ly/2KmSC0l