2019-11-19 01:17:07 +00:00
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action: global
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title: Defense evasion via process reimaging
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2019-12-19 22:56:36 +00:00
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id: 7fa4f550-850e-4117-b543-428c86ebb849
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2019-11-19 01:17:07 +00:00
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description: Detects process reimaging defense evasion technique
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# where
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# selection1: ImageFileName != selection1: OriginalFileName
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# selection1: ParentProcessGuid = selection2: ProcessGuid
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2020-06-03 07:00:59 +00:00
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# selection1: Image = selection2: TargetFilename
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2019-11-19 01:17:07 +00:00
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# and new field ImageFileName is coming from enrichment
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# selection1: Image = ^.+\\<ImageFileName>$
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# Rule must trigger if selection1 and selection2 both occurs in timeframe of 120 sec.
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# Rule logic is currently not supported by SIGMA.
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# Sysmon v.10.0 or newer is required for proper detection.
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status: experimental
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author: Alexey Balandin, oscd.community
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references:
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- https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/in-ntdll-i-trust-process-reimaging-and-endpoint-security-solution-bypass/
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tags:
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- attack.defense_evasion
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date: 2019/10/25
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detection:
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condition: all of them
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falsepositives:
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- unknown
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level: high
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---
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logsource:
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product: windows
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service: sysmon
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detection:
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selection1:
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category: process_creation
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fields:
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- Image
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- OriginalFileName
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- ParentProcessGuid
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new_fields:
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- ImageFileName
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---
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logsource:
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product: windows
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service: sysmon
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detection:
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selection2:
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EventID: 11
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fields:
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- ProcessGuid
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2020-06-03 07:00:59 +00:00
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- TargetFilename
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