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9864048ee9
#8411 PS: I've opened #10209 to solve the issue with Golang Code Coverage CI checks. - [X] Changes file added for user-visible changes in `changes/` or `orbit/changes/`. See [Changes files](https://fleetdm.com/docs/contributing/committing-changes#changes-files) for more information. - [x] Documented any API changes (docs/Using-Fleet/REST-API.md or docs/Contributing/API-for-contributors.md) - ~[] Documented any permissions changes~ - ~[ ] Input data is properly validated, `SELECT *` is avoided, SQL injection is prevented (using placeholders for values in statements)~ - ~[ ] Added support on fleet's osquery simulator `cmd/osquery-perf` for new osquery data ingestion features.~ - [X] Added/updated tests - [x] Manual QA for all new/changed functionality - ~For Orbit and Fleet Desktop changes:~ - ~[ ] Manual QA must be performed in the three main OSs, macOS, Windows and Linux.~ - ~[ ] Auto-update manual QA, from released version of component to new version (see [tools/tuf/test](../tools/tuf/test/README.md)).~
221 lines
6.1 KiB
Go
221 lines
6.1 KiB
Go
package sso
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import (
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"bytes"
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"crypto/rand"
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"crypto/x509"
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"encoding/base64"
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"encoding/xml"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"github.com/beevik/etree"
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"github.com/fleetdm/fleet/v4/server/fleet"
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rtvalidator "github.com/mattermost/xml-roundtrip-validator"
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dsig "github.com/russellhaering/goxmldsig"
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"github.com/russellhaering/goxmldsig/etreeutils"
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)
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type Validator interface {
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ValidateSignature(auth fleet.Auth) (fleet.Auth, error)
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ValidateResponse(auth fleet.Auth) error
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}
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type validator struct {
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context *dsig.ValidationContext
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clock *dsig.Clock
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metadata Metadata
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expectedAudiences []string
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}
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func Clock(clock *dsig.Clock) func(v *validator) {
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return func(v *validator) {
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v.clock = clock
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}
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}
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func WithExpectedAudience(audiences ...string) func(v *validator) {
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return func(v *validator) {
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v.expectedAudiences = audiences
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}
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}
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// NewValidator is used to validate the response to an auth request.
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// metadata is from the IDP.
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func NewValidator(metadata Metadata, opts ...func(v *validator)) (Validator, error) {
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v := validator{
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metadata: metadata,
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}
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var idpCertStore dsig.MemoryX509CertificateStore
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for _, key := range v.metadata.IDPSSODescriptor.KeyDescriptors {
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if len(key.KeyInfo.X509Data.X509Certificates) == 0 {
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return nil, errors.New("missing x509 cert")
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}
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certData, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(strings.TrimSpace(key.KeyInfo.X509Data.X509Certificates[0].Data))
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("decoding idp x509 cert: %w", err)
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}
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cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(certData)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("parsing idp x509 cert: %w", err)
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}
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idpCertStore.Roots = append(idpCertStore.Roots, cert)
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}
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for _, opt := range opts {
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opt(&v)
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}
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if v.clock == nil {
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v.clock = dsig.NewRealClock()
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}
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v.context = dsig.NewDefaultValidationContext(&idpCertStore)
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v.context.Clock = v.clock
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return &v, nil
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}
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func (v *validator) ValidateResponse(auth fleet.Auth) error {
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info := auth.(*resp)
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// make sure response is current
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onOrAfter, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339, info.response.Assertion.Conditions.NotOnOrAfter)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("missing timestamp from condition: %w", err)
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}
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notBefore, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339, info.response.Assertion.Conditions.NotBefore)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("missing timestamp from condition: %w", err)
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}
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currentTime := v.clock.Now()
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if currentTime.After(onOrAfter) {
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return errors.New("response expired")
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}
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if currentTime.Before(notBefore) {
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return errors.New("response too early")
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}
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verifiesAudience := false
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for _, audience := range v.expectedAudiences {
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if info.response.Assertion.Conditions.AudienceRestriction.Audience == audience {
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verifiesAudience = true
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break
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}
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}
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if !verifiesAudience {
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return errors.New("wrong audience:" + info.response.Assertion.Conditions.AudienceRestriction.Audience)
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}
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if auth.UserID() == "" {
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return errors.New("missing user id")
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}
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return nil
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}
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func (v *validator) ValidateSignature(auth fleet.Auth) (fleet.Auth, error) {
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info := auth.(*resp)
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status, err := info.status()
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if err != nil {
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return nil, errors.New("missing or malformed response")
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}
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if status != Success {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("response status %s", info.statusDescription())
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}
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// Examine the response for attempts to exploit weaknesses in Go's
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// encoding/xml
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decoded := info.rawResponse()
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err = rtvalidator.Validate(bytes.NewReader(decoded))
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("response XML failed validation: %w", err)
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}
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doc := etree.NewDocument()
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err = doc.ReadFromBytes(decoded)
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if err != nil || doc.Root() == nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("parsing xml response: %w", err)
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}
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elt := doc.Root()
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signed, err := v.validateSignature(elt)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("signing verification failed: %w", err)
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}
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// We've verified that the response hasn't been tampered with at this point
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signedDoc := etree.NewDocument()
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signedDoc.SetRoot(signed)
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buffer, err := signedDoc.WriteToBytes()
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("creating signed doc buffer: %w", err)
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}
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var response Response
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err = xml.Unmarshal(buffer, &response)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("unmarshalling signed doc: %w", err)
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}
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info.setResponse(&response)
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return info, nil
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}
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func (v *validator) validateSignature(elt *etree.Element) (*etree.Element, error) {
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validated, err := v.context.Validate(elt)
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if err == nil {
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// If entire doc is signed, success, we're done.
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return validated, nil
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}
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if err == dsig.ErrMissingSignature {
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// If entire document is not signed find signed assertions, remove assertions
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// that are not signed.
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err = v.validateAssertionSignature(elt)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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return elt, nil
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}
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return nil, err
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}
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func (v *validator) validateAssertionSignature(elt *etree.Element) error {
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validateAssertion := func(ctx etreeutils.NSContext, unverified *etree.Element) error {
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if unverified.Parent() != elt {
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return fmt.Errorf("assertion with unexpected parent: %s", unverified.Parent().Tag)
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}
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// Remove assertions that are not signed.
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detached, err := etreeutils.NSDetatch(ctx, unverified)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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signed, err := v.context.Validate(detached)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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elt.RemoveChild(unverified)
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elt.AddChild(signed)
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return nil
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}
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return etreeutils.NSFindIterate(elt, "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion", "Assertion", validateAssertion)
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}
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const (
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idPrefix = "id"
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idSize = 16
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idAlphabet = `1234567890abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ`
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)
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// There isn't anything in the SAML spec that tells us what is valid inside an
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// ID other than expecting that it has to be unique and valid XML. ADFS blows
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// up on '=' in the ID, so we are using an alphabet that we know works.
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//
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// Azure IdP requires that the ID begin with a character so we use the constant
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// prefix.
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func generateSAMLValidID() (string, error) {
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randomBytes := make([]byte, idSize)
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_, err := rand.Read(randomBytes)
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if err != nil {
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return "", err
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}
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for i := 0; i < idSize; i++ {
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randomBytes[i] = idAlphabet[randomBytes[i]%byte(len(idAlphabet))]
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}
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return idPrefix + string(randomBytes), nil
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}
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